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LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE THREAT TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
JAMES M. COOPER1

ABSTRACT
Bolivia, the chronically poor, landlocked Andean country has long seen
its indigenous populations marginalized, languishing in underdevelopent.
Spanish colonialists destroyed any vestige of the vibrant, complex
civilization that existed in the region – including the religious, political and
legal systems in place for centuries. In December 2005, Evo Morales Ayma
1 Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Center for Creative Problem Solving at California Western
School of Law. As Director of Proyecto ACCESO, a rule of law think-tank and human capacity building
organization in Latin America, he was an official observer, accredited by the Corte Nacional Electoral
de Bolivia for the January 25, 2009 national referendum on the New Political Constitution of the State
of Bolivia. The author wishes to thank Yesenia Acosta, Carlos Aguilar, Josefina Balistrieri, Drew
Lautemann, and Haera Manoukian for their research assistance. The author would like to acknowledge
the kind assistance of Professors William Aceves and Thomas D. Barton at California Western School
of Law. Brandon Baker, Barbara Glennan, Bobbi Ann Weaver, and Linda Weathers from the California
Western School of Law Library were very supportive with citation and research advice. Yerko Ilijic
Crosa and Dr. Jorg Stippel provided valuable insights about Bolivian indigenous issues. Marcela
Guadiana Cerda, James P. Kelly, Marina Shoupe, and Sebastian Vives del Solar were also very
supportive of this project. This Article is partially based on the author’s previous consulting work with
the Bolivian Vice-Ministry of Decentralization, the Vice-Ministry of Community Justice, and la
Representación Presidencial para la Asamblea Constituyente (the President’s Representative for the
Constituent Assembly Negotiations or REPAC) but its content represents the views of the author only.
The author thanks Sally Wong-Avery, Esq., the Avery-Tsui Foundation, and the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation for their support of Proyecto ACCESO’s work in Latin America over the years.
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was the first elected President of indigenous descent. After leading the
changes in the country’s Constitution, Morales continued to rule Bolivia
until the writing of this Article. The New Political Constitution of
Plurinational State of Bolivia of 2009 and a national law for community
justice, signed into law by Morales, provided the foundations for a legally
pluralistic judicial system – one in which traditional customary law works
in parallel with a more Western-styled system. While the right of selfdetermination and indigenous autonomy are promoted with this bifurcated
system of justice, there are many challenges to the international human
rights standards to which Bolivia has acceded as part of its participation in
the United Nations and Inter-American international legal systems.
This Article lays out the many treaty regimes of which Bolivia is a
member and the ways in which Bolivian customary law allowing for
indigenous traditions violates Bolivia’s international legal obligations. The
final part of the Article provides a brief survey of legal pluralistic projects
in other countries around the world and the ongoing struggle in balancing
the right of self-determination for Indigenous Peoples with international
human rights standards and protections.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2006, Evo Morales stood among the archaeological
remains of the Tiwanaku civilization that flourished thousands of years ago
near the shores of Lake Titicaca. Addressing an assembled crowd, he
promised to end the “colonial and neoliberal model.”2 A day later, a new
era began for Bolivia with Morales’ swearing in as the country’s President.3
On January 22, 2006, during his inauguration speech from the Government
Palace President Morales raised his fist and proclaimed that 500 years of
oppression would be replaced by 500 years of indigenous4 rule.5
It did not take long for Morales to act on the promises he made during
his presidential campaign. On May 1, 2006, Morales nationalized the oil
and gas industries in Bolivia.6 On June 3, 2006, Morales launched his
2 FRANCISCO PINEDA, EVO MORALES: EL CAMBIO COMENZÓ EN BOLIVIA 53 (2007); but see
FORREST HYLTON & SINCLAIR THOMSON, REVOLUTIONARY HORIZONS: PAST AND PRESENT IN
BOLIVIAN POLITICS 15 (2007).
3 See Amy Goodman, Evo Morales Sworn In as Bolivia's First Indigenous President, Hails
Election as “End of Colonial and Neo-Liberal Era,” DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 23, 2006),
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/1/23/evo_morales_sworn_in_as_bolivias (reporting that the
inaugural speeches of Evo Morales focused on the need to address justice for the indigenous
communities in the Andean country). “Today is the beginning of the new year for the original peoples
of the world, in which we seek equality and justice. With the strength of the people, with the unity of
the people, we will put an end to the colonial state and to the neo-liberal model.” Id.
4 The term “indigenous” is used throughout this Article to mean original or first nation. If other
articles, essays or journalistic writings use the term “Indian,” it will be reprinted in that form.
5 Evo Morales Ayma embodies the undoing of 500 years of exploitation and marginalization. “The
popular memory of struggles from indigenous anti-colonial revolts as well as the subsequent two
centuries of Indian peasant resistance shaped and informed both Morales’ election and the manner in
which he took possession of the presidency.” MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSON, PEOPLES OF THE EARTH:
ETHNONATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE INDIGENOUS CHALLENGE IN “LATIN” AMERICA, 100
(2010). Born in a mining village in the western Oruro Department of Bolivia, he herded llamas as a boy,
later served in the Bolivian military after attending high school, and then emigrated to the Chapare region
in eastern Bolivia to become a farmer with his family. Id. at 95. He became the leader of the coca growers
union and helped found a national political party – the Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento al
Socialism or “MAS”). Id. at 101. See generally MARTÍN SIVAK, JEFAZO: RETRATO ÍNTIMO DE EVO
MORALES (2008) “Morales logró que su posición fuera la mayoritaria en el Congreso de la
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) de 1994.” Id. at 125.
He eventually was elected a member of the House of Deputies, the lower house of the Bolivian Congress
in 1997 and ran for President in 2002, narrowly losing to Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, the former
President. Id. at 98-99. For the next several years, he became the opposition leader in Bolivia,
increasingly gaining national support, forcing Sánchez de Losada and his successor Carlos Mesa from
office, and eventually winning 54 percent of the vote in the December 2005 presidential election. Id. at
102-03.
6 See FRANCISCO PINEDA, EVO MORALES: EL CAMBIO COMENZÓ EN BOLIVIA 53 (2007). But see
FORREST HYLTON & SINCLAIR THOMSON, REVOLUTIONARY HORIZONS: PAST AND PRESENT IN
BOLIVIAN POLITICS 134 (2007): (“The ‘Heroes of the Chaco War Decree’ represented a partial break
with the neoliberal past, through it did not go as far as earlier nationalizations in Bolivian history.”). Id.;
see also Kathryn B. Botham, Bolivia’s Legal Gamble: Negotiating Nationalization, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J.
507, 508, 523 (2008) (proposing that Decree 28701 was “not nationalization at all.” Also stating,
“Bolivia is not ‘nationalizing’ in a traditional sense but is ‘negotiating nationalization.’”).
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“agrarian revolution” land reform plan by handing over roughly 9,600
square miles of state-owned land to poor indigenous people.7 Other
programs included the introduction of indigenous-centric education
programs,8 the expansion of growing areas to cultivate coca,9 and the
continuation of decentralization programs in rural areas.10 Following the
July 2, 2006 election of deputies, Morales established a Special Assembly
to create a new constitution for the reestablishing of the State of Bolivia on
August 6, 2006.11 A New Constitution12 with 411 articles was approved by
Constituent Assembly deputies on December 9, 2007.13 The New Political
Constitution for the State of Bolivia (hereinafter “the New Constitution of
7 Further land reform occurred on November 29, 2006 when a bill was passed by Bolivia’s
Congress.
Bolivia Passes Land Reform Bill, BBC NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2006, 8:06 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6194310.stm.
8 For an examination of the history of education reform in rural Bolivia, see Manuel E. Contreras,
A Comparative Perspective on Education Reforms in Bolivia: 1950-2000, in PROCLAIMING
REVOLUTION: BOLIVIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 213 (Merilee Grindle & Pilar Domingo, eds.,
2003); see also Brooke Larson, Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths and Minds: ‘El hogar campesino’
and Rural School Reform in Bolivia 1920s-1940s, in PROCLAIMING REVOLUTION: BOLIVIA IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 183 (Merilee Grindle & Pilar Domingo, eds., 2003).
9 See generally Will Reisinger, The Unintended Revolution: U.S. Anti-Drug Policy and the
Socialist Movement in Bolivia, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 237, 279 (2009) (for an exploration of the Bolivian
Government response to the U.S. war on drugs). See generally Cameron Ming, Zero Coca, Zero Culture:
Bolivia’s Struggle to Balance Cultural Identity and the Need for Economic Stability in the Midst of the
Expiring Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, 14 TULSA J. C OMP. & INT'L L. 375 (2007).
10 Decentralization is not a new policy initiative in Bolivia.
Administrative decentralization was actively encouraged by the international development
agencies at the same time it was favored by domestic groups for different reasons. For
neoliberals it is part of the strategy to reduce the role of the public sector, while the more
technocratically inclined advocate decentralization as a means to improve resource
management and allocation. Others view decentralization as part of a more or less radical
strategy for radicalization that will contribute to the empowerment of disadvantaged sectors of
the population.
Willem Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America, in THE CHALLENGE
OF DIVERSITY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND REFORM OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 3-22, 10 (Willem
Assies, Gemma va der Haar, & André J. Joekema eds., 2000). [hereinafter, Assies].
11
Bolivia to Write New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2006, 12:02 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4781340.stm; Country Report: Bolivia 2007, HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION,
1
(2008),
archived
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20131114014804/http://humanrightsfoundation.org/uploads/Bolivia_Com
munal_Justice_Report_.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION].
12 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA Feb. 7, 2009, art. 138
(Bol.). [hereinafter 2009 Bolivian Constitution or New Constitution].
13 This occurred with much controversy as
opposing political parties and leaders dispute[d] the validity of the vote, arguing that the
proposed constitution was not approved by the requisite two-thirds majority. They also took
issue [] that the text was approved not in the seat of the [Constituent] Assembly itself, in the
city of Sucre, but in the city of Oruro, and objected that no opposition deputies from the
Constituent Assembly were present at the vote.
HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 11.
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Bolivia”) was passed with 61% support in a national referendum on January
25, 2009, and contained many novel provisions intended to undo centuries
of discrimination against and marginalization of Bolivia’s indigenous
people.14 On February 9, 2009, President Morales promulgated the New
Constitution at an event in the Aymara-dominated city of El Alto.
Bolivia’s indigenous population comprises more than two-thirds of the
“total population of about eight million, the largest proportion in South
America.”15 The majority of these people live below the poverty line,16
most earning less than two dollars a day.17 Since the Spanish conquest of
the Americas, the indigenous people have been enslaved by their colonial
masters and marginalized in the post-independence, or “national,” period.18
14 Matthew Taylor, Evo Morales Hails ‘New Bolivia’ as Constitution is Approved, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 26, 2009, 4:57 A.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/bolivia (illustrating Evo
Morales’ claim after the new constitution was adopted stating, “Here we begin to reach true equality.”
In addition, “the president said the charter would ‘decolonise’ Bolivia by championing indigenous values
lost since the Spanish conquest.”).
15 Donna Lee Van Cott, A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia, 32 J.
LATIN AM. STUD. 207, 224 (2000) [hereinafter Van Cott, Legal Pluralism].
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has one of its highest levels of
inequality. The reduction in poverty rates experienced in the 1990s when Bolivia had modest
but consistent growth rates, was reversed by external and internal shocks at the end of the
millennium…. In addition, uneven distribution and poor quality of social services - particularly
health and education - have disproportionately harmed indigenous and rural populations.
Understanding Children’s Work Project, Trends in Children’s Employment and Child Labour in the
Latin
America
and Caribbean Region, at 1-2
(Nov. 2010), http://www.ucwproject.org/attachment/Bolivia_trends20110420_150241.pdf.
16 This is not new. “Bolivia has continually had one of the lowest per-capital incomes in Latin
America, and her political history has bordered on continual trauma.” WILLIAM H. BRILL, MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN BOLIVIA: THE OVERTHROW OF PAZ ESTENSSORO AND THE MNR 3 (1967).
[hereinafter, BRILL].
17 Omar S. Arias & Magdalena Bendini, Bolivia Poverty Assessment: Establishing The Basis for
BREVE
1,
1
(2006),
Pro-Poor
Growth,
89
EN
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENBREVE/Newsletters/20943040/89-MAY06-BoliviaPA.pdf;
“Bolivia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Latin America.” The World Factbook:
Bolivia, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html (last updated
Feb. 11, 2018) [hereinafter CIA Factbook]. In the 2009 United Nations Development Programme’s
Human Development Report, Bolivia scored number 113 out of 182 countries with only Nicaragua (No.
124) and Haiti (No. 149) behind it. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009: OVERCOMING BARRIERS HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT (2009),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf.
18 EDUARDO GALEANO, OPENS VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A
CONTINENT 39 (Cedric Belfrage trans., Monthly Rev. Press 25th ed. 1997) (1971). “In three centuries
Potosí’s Cerro Rico consumed 8 million lives. The Indians, including women and children, were torn
from their agricultural communities and driven to the Cerro. Of every ten who went up into the freezing
wilderness, seven never returned.” Id. Indigenous people have been historically excluded from Bolivian
civic life. See generally id. at 39-46. According to former Bolivian Vice President Victor Hugo
Cárdenas, “Bolivia has always had an exclusionary democracy, representing the paved streets of the
cities while leaving rural Indians legally invisible. Native peoples no longer want to be the object of
anthropological studies, but participants in constructing democracies.” Jack Epstein, Reversing its
History, Bolivia Gives Power to Indigenous People, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1995,
https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0216/16071.html.
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“[T]he legal propositions advanced on behalf of the rights of possession
asserted by the Spanish Crown and against the human rights of indigenous
peoples included Divine right, treasure trove and the barbarism of the
Indians.”19 Following independence, indigenous people were further
subjected to forced labor, had restrictions put on their movements, and were
marginalized from civil society during the respective national periods
throughout the region.
[I]ndigenous people were generally regarded as infamous and
noncitizens. The presumed modernity of the elites was bound up with
a paternalism that extended from the household to the society at large.
Bolivian leaders … saw themselves as bringing light, civilization,
and progress to barbarous and backward people.20
Historically, most of the indigenous communities received little or no
government support. As late as the 1930s, indigenous citizens were
not welcome in the white sections of La Paz, the nation’s capital.
Often, they were forced to bathe and change into “western” clothing
before entering the city. A 1925 decree prohibiting indigenous
people from areas near the main square was on the books until 1944.21
The New Political Constitution of the State of Bolivia attempts to reverse
much of the historic injustice and systemic discrimination by, among other
things, broadening the definitions of property to include communal
ownership, extending limited autonomy to regional prefects, enshrining
indigenous language and education rights, and reaffirming state control over
Bolivia’s vast natural gas reserves.22 It is no surprise then that when
President Morales, winding up his campaign to approve the new
constitution in late January 2009, stated from the Presidential Palace, “After
500 years, we have retaken the Plaza Murillo!”23
One of the more controversial elements of the New Political Constitution
of the State of Bolivia is the implementation of traditional justice systems
previously termed usos y costumbres and referred to by the Bolivian
19 Jeffrey N. Gesell, Customary Indigenous Law in the Mexican Juridical System, 26 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 643, 646 (1997) (citing Silvio A. Zavala, Las Instituciones Juridicas en la Conquista de
Amercia 27-28 (1971)).
20 Rossana Barragán, “The Spirit” of Bolivian Laws: Citizenship, Patriarchy and Infamy, in
HONOR, STATUS, AND LAW IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA 66, 80 (Sueann Caulfield et al., eds., 2005).
21 Epstein, supra note 18.
22 Mike Butler, Bolivian Constitution a Model for NZ?, BREAKINGVIEWS.CO.NZ (Mar. 11, 2012),
http://breakingviewsnz.blogspot.co.nz/2012/03/mike-butler-bolivian-constitution-model.html.
23 Simon Romero, Bolivians Ratify New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html.
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Government as justicia comunitaria (community justice).24 Articles 190,
191, and 192 provide for community justice for the indigenous people and
campesinos of Bolivia, a separate legal system that runs concurrently with
the national legal system of the country or what is called “ordinary justice.”
This bifurcated approach has long been a feature in Bolivia’s legal culture,
albeit in a less formalized or constitutionally mandated way:
Despite a formal jurisprudential hegemony, state legal institutions are
in practice weak in Bolivia, particularly outside of the few major
cities, which has had the effect, among other things, of enabling law
to develop primarily as a cultural and discursive system of
representation, one which is imbricated with social lives and
identities in such a way that ‘law’ embodies both the normative
(systems of rules enforceable, and enforced by, locally legitimate
authorities) and the nonnormative, in the sense that law, in addition
to acting as law, also constitutes other key social categories.25
This emerging system of indigenous custom is an example of legal
pluralism and a manifestation of the plurilateral nature of the refounded
state of Bolivia, as promoted by the Morales regime. Supporters view the
constitutional recognition of community justice and its integration into
Bolivia as part of the panoply of indigenous rights. “In part this derives
from the legacy of colonial rule, when a separate, subordinate legal system
for indigenous subjects – la República de Indios – existed alongside the
colonists’ law.”26 Many indigenista proponents of community justice
system view its new constitutionally protected status as the best manner by
which to respect traditional customs, to ensure self-determination, and to
promote autonomy.27
The centuries during which they were marginalized and isolated from
state-sanctioned forms of dispute resolution, indigenous peoples had to
resort to their own customs to resolve disputes. With the neoliberal state
that Bolivia embraced under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, there
24 Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, La ley comunitaria en Bolivia, Oct. 31,
http://www.cipca.org.bo/index.php/cipca-notas/cipca-notas-2004/361--sp-1641007672.
2004,
25 MARK GOODALE, DILEMMAS OF MODERNITY: BOLIVIAN ENCOUNTERS WITH LAW AND
LIBERALISM 24-25 (2009).
26 Rachel Sieder, Introduction, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS,
DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY 9 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002).
27 See, e.g., Christopher J. Fromherz, Indigenous Peoples’ Courts: Egalitarian Juridical Pluralism,
Self-Determination, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1341, 1373-74 (2008) (discussing that “[t]he constitutionalization of an indigenous judiciary
is part of a larger movement for greater self-government among the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, a
movement that is fundamentally interconnected with the development of democracy in Bolivia’s
history.”).
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was a noticeable increase in such recourse to self-help often expressed
through mob violence: “The vigilante lynching of criminal suspects has
become a common practice in the marginal barrios of Bolivian cities, with
the majority of such incidents being reported in the southern zone of
Cochabamba.”28 The rules, language, and geographical barriers that existed
made this a matter of self-help and self-preservation. Municipalization
efforts during the 1990s, as part of the neoliberal project, along with other
policies pursued as part of the Washington Consensus29 also provided an
impetus towards self-help mechanisms including those for dispute
resolution.30
The critics of community justice, however, are many. There are some
practices that are glaring breaches of fundamental human rights protections.
In addition to the lack of due process, the issue of a lack of judicial integrity
also surfaces. Often the same person doing the judging is also the municipal
authority, reducing the separation of powers to a historic relic. Moreover,
there is no right to appeal. Corporal punishment, including the use of the
whip, is commonplace.31 Women’s hair has been shaved in cases of alleged
adultery.32 Communities have resorted to vigilantism and public lynching
in the name of indigenous justice.33
The most high-profile case of such mob violence occurred on March 7,
2009, when hundreds of indigenous peasants attacked and looted the home
28 Daniel Goldstein, Flexible Justice: Neoliberal Violence and Self-help’ Security in Bolivia, in
GLOBAL VIGILANTES, 239, 244 (David Pratten & Atreyee Sen eds. 2008) [hereinafter Goldstein,
Flexible Justice]; see also Rape Suspect Buried Alive in Bolivia, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22811105 (discussing that local indigenous residents
in Bolivia tied up, threw inside and buried a 17-year-old man in an open grave next to the 35-year-old
female victim in which he was accused of raping and murdering).
29 The Washington Consensus is the expression that came to explain the process of deregulation,
privatization, lowering of tariff and other trade barriers and promotion of neo-liberal and free market
economics. The protectionist policies of past decades, like import substitution and state-led national
industrialization, were to be reversed and replaced by policies that opened markets to international
competitors who would in turn promote economic growth investment, production, and efficiency. See
John Williamson, From Reform Agenda: A Short History of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions
for What to Do Next, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, Sept. 2003, at 10; and Carol M. Rose, Privatization
– The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 (2006).
30 In exchange for the adoption by developing countries of certain rules and regulations concerning
the functioning of markets and some strengthening of democratic institutions, the international financial
community lent money to these nascent democracies in an attempt to encourage a set of “neoliberal”
policies – the so-called Washington Consensus. Williamson, supra note 29, at 10.
31 Lucy Ash, Bolivia Goes Back to the Whip, BBC NEWS: BBC RADIO 4’S CROSSING CONTINENTS
(Nov. 23, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/6173268.stm.
32 Monte Reel, Bolivia’s Burning Question: Who May Dispense Justice?, WASH. POST (Feb. 2,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/01/AR2008020103426.html.
33 Andres Schipani, Bolivia Sees Rise in Mob Justice, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7337173.stm.
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of Victor Hugo Cárdenas, an Aymara intellectual and former Vice-President
of Bolivia, some 56 miles west of La Paz. Cardenas’ wife, Lidia Catari, and
other family members were injured in the attack.34 “In the Cardenas case,
indigenous Bolivians determined that the provision on land holdings gave
them the green light to apply indigenous communal justice.”35 It was also
clear that Cárdenas was being punished for leading the campaign to defeat
the New Constitution in the national referendum of January 25, 2009.36
This well-documented attack near Lake Titicaca was only one of many
such extrajudicial lynchings that have occurred in Bolivia since Morales
took power. On February 26, 2008, an angry mob held three police officers,
suspected of corruption, and beat and tortured them for hours only to then
hang them.37 The Human Rights Foundation detailed forty-six such cases
of mob violence in a report.38 It is not surprising then that the foundation
found that community justice represents “the dilution of state authority and
the incorporation into law of an unenforceable, arbitrary system, a discourse
that is used to justify vigilante violence and other human rights
violations.”39
Such tension over the weaknesses in the rule of law is a longtime feature
in Bolivian history. 40 When the countries of Latin America gained
independence in the early part of the nineteenth century, it was important
for the consolidation of those respective countries, that there be one, unitary
law. “However, in practice a situation of legal pluralism – the overlapping
coexistence of different legal and regulatory orders – has prevailed across
34 Bolivia: Unequivocally Condemn Mob Violence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Mar. 12, 2009, 7:01
P.M.), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/12/bolivia-unequivocally-condemn-mob-violence; see
also Laz Paz and Santa Cruz, The Permanent Campaign, THE ECONOMIST (July 16, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14031312.
35 Will the Rule of Law Apply to all Bolivians?, MIGRATE FREEDOM HOUSE (Mar. 27, 2009),
https://migratefreedomhouse.wordpress.com/2009/03/27/will-the-rule-of-law-apply-to-all-bolivians/.
36 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2009 Country
Reports
on
Human
Rights
Practices:
Bolivia
(Mar.
11,
2010),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136102.htm.
37 Three Police Officers Lynched in Bolivia, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2008, 11:10 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN27429484 [hereinafter REUTERS, Three Police Officers Lynched];
see also Andean Governance Briefs, MIGRATE FREEDOM HOUSE (Feb. 27, 2008),
https://migratefreedomhouse.wordpress.com/2008/02/27/andes-governanc/.
38 See generally Human Rights Foundation, supra note 11, at 2-4.
39 Trevor Kenney, What is Community Justice in Bolivia, U. LETHBRIDGE: U. NEWS COMMUNITY
(Mar. 18, 2009), https://www.uleth.ca/unews/article/what-community-justice-bolivia#.WJuvkhiZNDV.
40 NANCY GREY POSTERO, NOW WE ARE CITIZENS: INDIGENOUS POLITICS IN
POSTMULTICULTURAL BOLIVIA 9 (2007).
Conflict between Indians and the state is not new; it has been at the center of Bolivian politics
since colonial times. To understand current struggles for Indian rights, it is therefore critical to
understand the historical sediments, the outcomes of past conflicts that determine current
distributions of power and influence.
Id.

2018]

LEGAL PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA

11

the continent.”41
This Article shall explore how the New Political Constitution of the State
of Bolivia and the legislation concerning community justice that has been
proposed by the Bolivian Executive creates an indigenous justice system
that violates the fundamental human rights that Bolivia has acceded by
means of international treaties. Part II of this Article explores the long
history of constitutional reforms in Bolivia and the manner in which
indigenous peoples have struggled to be treated equally under Bolivian law
and have developed their own customary laws.
Part III of this Article shall then detail the legal framework that the
Morales administration has laid down for Bolivia and the legal foundations
of the Bolivian Government’s plurilateral approach – one that is designed
to redress the centuries of underdevelopment and the lack of inclusion of
indigenous customary legal practices in the legal system of Bolivia.42 Part
IV shall then examine the international legal obligations under international
law to protect fundamental civil rights and to which Bolivia has acceded to
and has implemented into the country’s domestic law. Part V concludes
with an examination of the manner in which the new legal framework that
the Morales administration was promulgated may violate those very
international legal obligations to which Bolivia has agreed. The tension
created by the implementation of a legal pluralism is explored and whether
such a policy can truly redress half a millennium of indigenous
marginalization. This Article explores the dangers of mob rule that may
come with the poorly executed integration of indigenous problem-solving
systems into the Western model of justice, which themselves are the mere
vestiges of Spanish colonialism. Indigenous law may be the ruling law in
many of the places where people live. It is often justice in rural
communities, but with internal migration in Bolivia, these traditional
practices are being enforced in more urban settlement areas. As the State
has abdicated large tracts of land for other political players to have the
monopoly of force, these are the natural self-help measures – straight out of
the neo-liberal playbook – a privatization of sorts. Legal pluralism can
bring about chaos as international legal obligations are routinely violated in
the name of self-determination.43
41 Sieder, supra note 26, at 9.
42 “Few vestiges of indigenous law survive (officially, at least) in Latin America.” Lawrence M.
Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 65, 75.
(1996).
43 “Despite representing an important step forward in the legal recognition of indigenous collective
rights, the paradigm of official multiculturalism has been much criticized.” Rachel Sieder, The Judiciary
and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 211, 214 (2007) [hereinafter Sieder,
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I. THE HISTORY AND USE OF INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAW IN
BOLIVIA
The exploitation and destruction of indigenous communities during the
conquest of the Americas by Spain (and Portugal) has long been
documented.44 The diseases that the Europeans brought to the New World
killed millions; those who survived were enslaved by forced labor, tributes
and other taxes, and other regimes that robbed the peoples of the Continent
of their resources, cultures, and civilizations.45 Bolivia’s mines – originally
geared for the extraction of silver and then tin – brought untold riches to the
conquistadores and suffering to the local people who toiled there.46
Elsewhere, the conquistadores followed a different model:
Colonial domination in the highlands took a different path. There the
Indian population was much greater, and the Inca empire had left a
pre-existing system of indirect rule. The Spanish assumed control
over this system, leaving land in the hands of the native peasants and
the local governing power in the hands of caciques, local elites whose
Judiciary].
44 The Spanish colonial powers provided Spaniards with land grants called encomenderos.
“Although the encomenderos were officially prohibited from extracting Indian labor, they had enormous
power over their charges and used their labor for their own interests.” POSTERO, supra note 40, at 27.
45 But see Robert H. Jackson, La raza y la definición de la identidad del “indio” en las fronteras
de la America Española colonial, 26 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES 116, 117 (2007). Historically,
Spanish policy towards South America
[A]ttempted to create stable native communities that were to play an integral role in the new
colonial society as labor reserves and contributors to economic development and the treasury….
At the same time, the missionaries frequently preserved and perpetuated the authority of native
leaders as a means of assuring social and political stability within the missions…. The Spanish
created a colonial political system based upon indirect rule. Indigenous political leaders
governed as representatives of the colonial state, and were held responsible for maintaining
order in native communities and delivering tribute payments and labor.
46
The Spanish Crown created two types of compulsory laborers: the yanaconas and the mitayos.
The yanaconas were exepted from mita service and were basically serfs or slaves permanently
bound to large private estates where they worked the fields or served in the household of the
landowner. The mitayos were Indians organized under the mita to provide low-paid or unpaid
labor for a percentage of the year, working in the mines. The mita combined the Incan system
of tribute labor with the Iberian medieval feudal system of obligatory labor and adopted it to
the capitalistic needs of the New World entrepreneurs, particularly the mining industrialists.”
WALTRAUD Q. MORALES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 27 (2003). “However it appeared in
theory, the mita proved to be disastrous for the Indians, who were commonly forced to work
beyond their terms of service if they survived its perils; they were not always paid, and when
they were, their wages were far below free market levels; villages were commonly forced to
send more than their allotted number of laborers, and more frequently than specified. A
summons to labor in the mines came to be viewed as a virtual death warrant. Excessive labor
under most adverse conditions, an inadequate diet, disease, accidents, and above all, what must
have been spiritual suffocation contributed to soaring mortality among mitayos.
R.C. Padden, Editor’s Introduction, in TALES OF POTOSÍ xix (R.C. Padden, ed., 1975).
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authority was inherited from their Incan nobility forebears.47
The caciques, in turn, collected the taxes and delivered them to the
Spanish Crown. Royal protection was traded for the tributary obligations,
based on the mita, a pre-Columbian collective labor system.48 As such, the
indigenous communities were not treated equally and were in need of
special protection, which inevitably meant the royal courts did not protect
their limited rights.49 It is not surprising then that Spanish law was viewed
as an instrument of exploitation.50 The indigenous population was seen as
primitive and not subject to equal treatment under colonial rules:51 “They
also had a particular legal-juridical status as ‘miserable’ individuals
(miserables).”52
But despite the relative relaxation of exploitation of the expanding rural
Indian peasant population, that population remained bitterly opposed to its
overlords. The unending exactions of local corregidores and hacendados,
the demands of local corvée labor obligations which often went for private
Spanish interests rather than state concerns, and the steady taxation which
constantly forced all Indians into the marketplace were thoroughly
resented.53
Independence from Spain did not greatly change the situation, despite
much posturing by regimes that emerged during the national period:54
47 POSTERO, supra note 40, at 27.
48 See, e.g., Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in ResourceRich Countries Through Middle Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 199, 232 (2013) (discussing
that the “Spanish colonizers implemented the mita or compulsory work scheme in the mines, resulting
in the exploitation of indigenous peoples.”).
49 “Their legal cases were to be expeditious, avoiding some of the usual juridical procedures, and
they were represented in the courts by the Protector of Indians.” Barragán, supra note 20, at 79.
50 “Following upon the controversies provoked by the conquest, ‘Indians’ were declared free
vassals not subject to servitude. Yet they paid tribute in recognition of the dominion of the Spanish
kings and their role as protectors and administrators of the Indies.” Id.
51
[T]hough unremunerated personal service for private benefit was prohibited, they were obliged
by the state to carry out a series of tasks in the mines, on haciendas, and in public works. This
corvée labor obligation was justified because of their ‘limited capacities,’ the ‘benefit’ that
Spanish intervention entailed for them, their similarity to ‘rustics’ in Spain, and their ‘more apt
nature’ for labor.
Id.
52 Id. “This status was determined by their ‘imbecile nature’ and poverty, their recent conversion
to Catholicism, their lesser capacity for rationality, and their “inability to govern themselves.’” Id.
53 HERBERT S. KLEIN, BOLIVIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY 74 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter KLEIN, EVOLUTION].
54
After independence, in keeping with the ostensibly egalitarian principles of liberalism,
indigenous people had no specific juridical status in either the constitutions or legal codes
(penal, civil, or procedural). They were not even named in these texts, suggesting that they were
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Given the general absence of a specific legal status for indigenous
people, the colonial position of the Protector of Indians, and thus the
limited legal privileges of indigenous status, disappeared. But
another body of laws that were more conjunctural in nature – the
laws, decrees, orders, and resolutions – displays an abundance of
specific dispositions referring to ‘Indians’ and reveals that in fact
their legal situation was not altogether transformed. Among these
dispositions, for example, was the legislation regulating the
‘indigenous contribution,’ a neocolonial form of tribute to the state.
Despite initial attempts to abolish this differential tax, as a colonial
vestige incompatible with enlightened liberal principles, the Bolivian
state was fiscally unable to do without it.55
During the national period, there remained much inequality before the
law.56 “The overall result of republican liberalism for the majority of
Indians in the Andean region was a stunning loss of communal lands and
deep cultural incursions, as Indians became subject of law and liberal
bureaucratic regimes controlled by whites and mestizos.”57 There was a
great deal of residual racism that maintained the segregation between
Bolivians of European ancestry and the indigenous communities: “A door
was let open to equality, at least at a juridical level, but in order to attain
equality and citizenship, indigenous people would have to undergo a
process of ‘civilization.’”58 Indigenous people would be kept on the outside
of Bolivian society, marginalized as uncivilized, infamous, and illiterate.59
Successive constitutions maintained this situation of inequality, making the
democratic franchise dependent upon literacy.60
considered along with all others in the categories of Bolivians and citizens.
Barragán, supra note 20, at 79-80.
55 Id.
56 “Despite the claims of modernity in the Bolivian legal codes, the laws were not based upon the
assumption that society was composed of equal individuals.” Id. at 70-71.
57 POSTERO, supra note 40, at 34.
58 Barragán, supra note 20, at 80.
59
Even if the codes did mark a change, adopting a foreign Spanish model implied an ongoing
cultural and ideological if not direct colonial domination. I would assert that Bolivians followed
the Spanish, rather than the Napoleonic, code because it allowed the maintenance of culturally
engrained discrimination on the basis of reputation and social status, reserving citizenship for
honorable and reputable men, as opposed to infamous and illiterate men, and civil rights to
privileged women of good credit, not those of low or “unknown” reputation.
Id. at 79.
60
By determining who exercised political and civil rights, the constitutions distinguished between
those who were citizens and those who were merely of Bolivian nationality. Bolivians were
simply all people born within the republic, while citizens were those Bolivians who were male,
over twenty-one years of age or married, literate, and not domestic servants...In the case of
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In 1874, a land reform ended the Indian tribute and made communal
property illegal. This allowed for the commercial use of Indian lands and
the beginning of the latifundio (or estate) landholding system.61 Eventually,
“[t]he result was a confused legal system contested at every level by Indians
who tried to defend their colonial livelihoods.”62 A civil war in 1898 did
not change this situation for indigenous communities in Bolivia. The
indigenous people, with rural peasants, pursued campaigns in the 1910s and
1920s to change the laws of the country to provide for laws and courts for
indigenous peoples. The struggle for the rights of indigenous communities
was motivated by a shared history of violence and the repeated failures by
the Bolivian state to apply the law equally.
With the 1932 Chaco War, however, the debate over special laws and
courts for indigenous people ended: “Ultimately Bolivia’s 1920s indigenista
lawmakers failed to create a ‘special’ legal code for Indians; nor did they
establish a patronato or indigenous tribunal.”63 When Bolivia went to war
in 1932 over the Chaco, indigenous people were cannon fodder.64 At the
end of the war, soldiers returned from the front to populate the cities and
social mobilization soon followed. With poor healthcare facilities for the
wounded and the inevitable social dislocation that resulted from the war,
there was much public outcry. Military socialist presidents came in and out
of power and by 1938, there was a constitutional convention which
addressed, among other issues, the nation’s legal system. Notwithstanding
public sentiment for change, there was a strong focus on national unity. As
such, the “Indian problem” was seen by the convention delegates as the
national problem.65
Bolivia, the requirements for citizenship excluded the great majority of the population. The
indigenous and mestizo majority spoke native languages that were oral, and they usually lacked
Spanish literacy. Moreover, most could not exercise the political right to vote or be elected to
office owing to their dependent status. Other criteria for social differentiation were sex and age.
Because of their sex, women were not only excluded from citizenship, but they were not
allowed to file accusations, except in cases in which they were directly and personally involved.
Similarly excluded were minors and those whose occupation or profession did not yield a
minimum annual income of three hundred pesos. Such requirements for citizenship were
maintained in all Bolivian constitutions until 1938.
Id. at 71.
61 POSTERO, supra note 40, at 32.
62 Id. at 33-34.
63 LAURA GOTKOWITZ, A REVOLUTION FOR OUR RIGHTS: INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES FOR LAND
AND JUSTICE IN BOLIVIA 1880-1952 68 (2007).
64 “Aymara and Quechua Indians and peasants filled the army’s rank and file and prevailed in the
long lists of dead and wounded. Middle and upper-class men obtained easy exemptions from frontline
duty or even from miltary service altogether; those who did serve were generally rearguard officers or
doctors.” Id. at 104.
65 Id. at 115.
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The 1938 Constitution provided for a state-managed economy but the
convention delegates failed to pass binding legislation providing civil and
human rights to Bolivia’s indigenous peoples.66 Some radical delegates to
the constitutional convention had been so bold as to propose the
abolishment of the involuntary personal servitude on haciendas and the
establishment of a system of collective land ownership.67 Even after the
Second World War, there was still extreme inequality in the division of land,
keeping the peasantry, an overwhelming percentage of which were
indigenous, in a permanent state of subsistence.68 The next two decades
saw a series of reforms and the eventual overturning of those reforms by a
conservative, repressive oligarchy.69 Political instability was at an all-time
high.
Between 1935 and 1952, Bolivia experienced five successful coups
(1935, 1936, 1937, 1943, 1951); two successful urban insurrections (1946
and 1952); at least three large-scale bloody encounters between the army
and labor groups (1942, 1947, 1950); and a brief civil war in 1949. In
addition, against a background of political challenge and reprisal there were
untold abortive coup plots, small-scale bloody and bloodless strikes and
demonstrations, numerous political murders, and uncountable jailings and
exilings. Political violence was definitely not new to Bolivian public life,
but the quantity and quality of the violence during this period was.70
With the chaos of the 1951 elections, a military junta (governing body)
took power during a political vacuum, denying the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) the landslide victory it had
surprisingly won.71 In reaction to this, on April 9, 1952, peasants, armed by
66 But see Morales, supra note 46, at 112 (“The Busch convention stood out as a landmark of social
progress and reform.”).
67 Id. at 113.
67
Controlling access to the best lands in all the zones of the republic, the hancenados obtained
their labor force by offering usufruct estate lands in exchange for labor. The Indians were
required to supply seeds, tools, and in some cases even animals for this work, which left the
owner with few capital inputs to supply. The Indians were even required to transport the final
crop. The hacendado also required personal service to himself, his family, and his overseers.
Pongueaje (personal service obligation) had been part of the work requirements of estate
Indians since colonial times.
HERBERT S. KLEIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 210 (2003). [hereinafter KLEIN, HISTORY].
69 “[C]apitalist agro-industrial enterprise expanded rapidly throughout the region, permitting a new
Eastern agricultural bourgeoisie to take over huge extensions of the best land. This effectively nullified
the Agrarian Reform Law in this highly desirable region by generating a highly unequal distribution of
land and capital.” Xavier Albó, Bolivia: From Indian and Campesino Leaders to Councillors and
Parliamentary Deputies, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY
AND DEMOCRACY (Rachel Sieder ed.) 75 (2002).
70 JAMES M. MALLOY, BOLIVIA: THE UNCOMPLETED REVOLUTION 323 (1970). [hereinafter
MALLOY].
71 CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, THE LEGACY OF POPULISM IN BOLIVIA: FROM MNR TO MILITARY
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the MNR, took control of local governmental outposts and police duties as
that law enforcement institution completely crumbled. Armed units of
miners took over control of mining camps.72 The 1952 Revolution resulted
after a broad alliance of a military government with the workers’ parties,
indigenous leaders, middle class students, and urban intellectuals was
formed. The new regime set about making large-scale changes including
universal suffrage by eliminating the literacy requirement for voting:73 “In
one stroke, the Indian peasant masses were enfranchised, and the voting
population jumped from some two hundred thousand to just under one
million persons.”74
The governing MNR under President Víctor Paz Estenssoro nationalized
the mines without compensation,75 dismantled the army replacing it with
militias, and instituted an agrarian reform.76 Work records of peasants were
destroyed to eliminate all forms of peasant work obligations.
Such rapid changes in the governance structures of the country resulted
in the collapse of some of the state institutions. This instability combined
with new entitlements from social welfare programs to create inflation and
economic instability.77 The middle class was being severely injured by
these events and threw its support behind the Bolivian Socialist Falangist
Party (FSB), which to date had only been a minority political force in the
country.78 Notwithstanding the changes in Bolivian society, the indigenous
communities became more conservative and focused on healthcare and
securing their respective land titles, rather than their formal rights or
RULE 32 (1977).
72 See generally JAMES DUNKERLEY, REBELLION IN THE VEINS: POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN BOLIVIA,
1952-82 (1984). [hereinafter DUNKERLEY].
73 “The Bolivian National Revolution has not only given the Indian the land, it has made him a
citizen.” ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION 80 (1958).
74 KLEIN, HISTORY, supra note 68, at 212.
75 James M. Malloy, Revolutionary Politics, in BEYOND THE REVOLUTION: BOLIVIA SINCE 1952,
at 120 (James M. Malloy & Richard S. Thorn eds., 1971).
76 Id. at 233-68. But see MALLOY, supra note 70, at 191 (“[I]t is no wonder that there was stubborn
resistance both within and without the MNR to the idea of generalized land reform.”).
77
The takeover of the mines drained massive sums from the state coffers, and agrarian reform
reduced agricultural deliveries to the cities drastically, thus necessitating massive food imports
to prevent starvation. The only way to resolve all of these problems was to increase national
currency. The result was one of the world’s most spectacular records of inflation from 1952 to
1956. In that time the cost of living increased twentyfold, with annual inflation rates of over
900 percent.
KLEIN, EVOLUTION, supra note 53, at 236. “The specter of inflation haunted the National Revolution
from the beginning...After 1952 the tendency of the value of the boliviano to decline got out of hand,
and inflation assumed agonizing proportions.” Alexander, supra note 73, at 201.
78 MATTHEW CRAIN, REPRESSION AND ACCOMMODATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY STATES 150 (2000).
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reclamation of their traditional justice system.
In fact, the indigenous communities did not play much of a role at all in
the making of the revolution.79 The indigenous peoples of Bolivia were not
affected by the policies instituted by the MNR during the 1952 Revolution
and thereafter.80 Moreover many of the changes that were undertaken by
President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, were short-lived as he was eventually
overthrown by the army bringing to an end the many years of fundamental
change in Bolivia started in 1952.81 General Réné Barrientos took power in
1964 beginning an eighteen-year period of military regimes brought to
power by coups d’etat.82
During this time, the term “Indio” was abolished from the official
language of the state.83 The 1967 Bolivian Constitution, the country’s
fifteenth, did not refer to indigenous peoples or ethnic minorities. There is
a reference “to community lands and campesino syndicates though.”84 The
1967 Bolivian Constitution was altered through a number of reform efforts,
some of them haphazard in nature.
In 1971, the military government under General Hugo Banzer attempted
to corporatize the labor movement in its suppression of labor discontent.85
This policy of isolation also involved the heavy-handed tactics of military
suppression of blockades and other protests by the indigenous
communities.86 All the while, Banzer “[P]aid lip service to the idea of
popular participation through elections….”87
Throughout the 1980s legislation “recognized the existence of
79 “Indian peasants played no role in the insurrection of 1952. Even with the significant expansion
of the scope of conflict, the insurrection involved on all sides only a small part of the actual population
of Bolivia.” Malloy, supra note 70, at 164.
80 “The 1952 revolution addressed some of these injustices, with an agrarian reform program that
gave land to Indian peasants. Nevertheless, Indians continued to suffer widespread economic and
political discrimination.” POSTERO, supra note 40, at 4.
81 DUNKERLEY, supra note 72, at 120.
82 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE SITUATION
IN
BOLIVIA,
Number
92-67,
Sept.
24,
1967
at
5,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000011780.pdf; see also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1964-1968, VOLUME XXXI, SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA; MEXICO,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi/36271.htm.
83 Erick D. Langer with Elena Muñoz, Introduction, CONTEMPORARY INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS
IN LATIN AMERICA xvi (Erick Detlef Langer & Elena Muñoz eds 2003).
84 DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY
IN LATIN AMERICA 135 (Billie R. De Walt ed. 2000) [hereinafter VAN COTT, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION].
85 “In dealing with the peasants, Banzer has not tried to duplicate Barrientos’s policy of using the
campesinos as an offstage support base to keep urban forces in line. Instead, he has sought to keep the
rural majority neutralized and divorced from political activity.” MITCHELL, supra note 71, at 127.
86 Albó, supra note 69, at 76.
87 TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLE VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY 180
(2000). In the end “the Banzer regime was part of the general trend toward Right-oriented authoritarian
regimes that developed in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s.” JAMES M. MALLOY & EDUARDO
GAMARRA, REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA, 1964-1985 108 (1988).
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indigenous customary law, declared the Indians not responsible for their
actions because of their primitive state, and placed them under protection of
the state.”88 Throughout the 1980s, however, leftist intellectuals, popular
organizations, anthropologists, and the emerging indigenous leadership
began a discourse about the “pluricultural” nature of Bolivia’s society and
state, and how a comprehensive constitutional reform process might be
achieved.89
There was a move away from protecting indigenous rights at the
collective level, to protecting indigenous rights of the individual indigenous
groups.90 Groups began to think of themselves as Guaraní, Quechua, and
Aymara rather than as indigenous groups as a whole. It was then that
Guaraní communities in the eastern lowlands of the country began political
mobilizations.91 The Guaraní linked with a non-governmental organization.
They worked toward a national project to refine the role of the state as well
as the relationship that indigenous people had with the state.92 By the 1990s
there were a series of mobilizations by other indigenous organizations. One
such march (the March for Territory and Dignity) occurred in 1990 against
incursions by logging companies, inspired a renewed debate among
Bolivia’s intellectuals and policymakers as to the causes of Bolivia’s
political instability, and led to the creation of nine indigenous territories by
decree.93
During the administration of Jaime Paz Zamora, which ran from 1989 to
1993, through the administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (199388 See VAN COTT, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION, supra note 84, at 135.
89 Id.
90 “In the Andean context, it had been customary for Indians seeking to gain the status of being
mestizo to forsake their own communities and reject their Native heritage. The individual who did so,
however, found himself ‘part of a despised ‘cholo’ minority in a world dominated by urban upper classes
to which he cannot aspire.” ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 96.
91
In the 1980s the indigenous peoples of eastern Bolivia organized themselves into new political
movements. These movements have led, for the first time in the history of eastern Bolivia, to
the development of pan-Indian and intra-ethnic organizations. These groups have now a large
constituency and receive funding to implement their own projects. For the Bolivian Guarani
the struggle for their rights has led to a process of empowerment, and the political vindications
of native peoples have led to major transformations of the state.
Silvia María Hirsch, The Emergence of Political Organizations among the Guarani Indians of Bolivia
and Argentina: A Comparative Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS IN LATIN
AMERICA 81, 82 (Erick D. Langer & Elena Muñoz eds., 2003). Two of these political organizations were
the “CIDOB, a pan-Indian confederation that groups the indigenous peoples of eastern Bolivia; and the
Asamblea del Pueble Guarani, an intra-ethnic organization composed only of Guarani Indians.” Id. at
83.
92 Id. at 89.
93 Assies, supra note 10, at 15.
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1997) there was a flurry of law-making to appease the growing indigenous
movements.94 Bolivia attempted to redefine its relations with native peoples
by sanctioning new laws (including the Ley de Participación Popular
(“LPP”) and Ley de Reforma Educativa) that recognized the ethnic
pluralism of the country and gave greater autonomy to indigenous peoples.95
Suddenly, Bolivia looked progressive compared to some of its
neighbors. The country was among the first signatories of the International
Labour Organization’s Convention No. 169.96 In the convention, the term
“lands” may include the concept of territories that goes beyond the control
of natural resources therein. 97 The major change in the country’s
constitutional regime for indigenous rights in 1994 was contained in Article
171 (Part III), which read:
The natural authorities of the indigenous and peasant communities
may exercise the functions of administration and application of their
own norms as an alternative solution to conflicts, in conformity with
their customs and procedures, as long as they are not contrary to this
constitution and the laws. The law will make these functions
compatible with the attributions of the Power of the State.98
The previous Bolivian Constitution actually allowed for these
mechanisms and the results of their justice procedure. Article 171 of the
Constitución Política del Estado stated:
The social, economic and cultural rights of Indigenous Peoples are
officially recognized, respected and protected, particularly those
relative to their rights to the use and sustainable exploitation of their
traditionally-owned land and resources, and those relative to their
94 Van Cott, Legal Pluralism, supra note 15, at 225.
95 Hirsch, supra note 91, at 83.
The Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997), in which Aymara leader Victor Hugo
Cárdenas became vice-president, undertook a ‘second generation’ of reforms which included a
reform of the Constitution and a policy of decentralization, municipalization, and participation
which basically took shape in the 1994 Ley de Participación Popular. Whereas until then only
some twenty municipalities had effectively existed in the country, the new law increased the
number to over 300. At the same time the distribution of tax revenues was changed in favor of
the municipalities and they were given a series of responsibilities.
Assies, supra note 10, at 11.
96 Albó, supra note 69, at 77. Laurie Sargent, The Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia’s Amazon Basin
Region and ILO Convention No. 169: Real Rights or Rhetoric?, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 451,
460 (1998).
97 Assies, supra note 10, at 15.
98 VAN COTT, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION, supra note 88, at 176; see also Constitución Política de la
República de Bolivia de 1967 con Reformas de 1994 y Texto Concordado de 1995, art. 171. [hereinafter
1967 Constitution with 1994 reforms and 1995 agreed text].
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identity, values, languages, customs and institutional structures.99
Article 171 further provided:
The social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples [of
Bolivia] are recognized, respected and protected in the standard of
the law, especially those relative to communal lands of origin,
guaranteeing the use and supporting the sustainable utilization [of]
natural resources, their identity, values, languages, customs and
institutions.
The State recognizes the juridical personality of indigenous and
rural communities and of rural associations and syndicates.
The natural authorities of indigenous and rural communities may
exercise the functions of administering and applying their own rules
as an alternative solution to conflicts, in accordance with their
customs and procedures, [provided that] they are not contrary to this
Constitution and the laws. The Law [will homologate] these
functions … with the prerogatives of the Powers of State.100
Moreover, “[t]he 1994 constitutional reforms acknowledge Bolivia as a
‘multiethnic, pluricultural society’ and allow[ed] the indigenous nations to
assume ownership of traditional lands.”101 The 1993 Law of Constitutional
Reform drew language about indigenous rights from the 1991 Colombian
Constitution.102
There was, however, a strong reaction during the mid-1990s in
congressional circles about the addition of indigenous rights to Bolivian
law.103 This could have been the reason that Title 1 of the Code failed to
list such rights, leaving it until Article 28. That Article 28 provided for the
primacy for individual human rights demonstrates the regard for which
99 “Se reconocen, respetan y protegen en el marco de la Ley, los derechos sociales, económicos y
culturales de los pueblos indígenas que habian en el territorio nacional, especialmente los relativos a sus
tierras comunitarias de origen, garantizando el uso y aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos
naturales, a su intentidad, valores lenguas, costumbres e instituciones.” Constitución Política de la
República de Bolivia de 1967 con Reformas de 1994 y Texto Concordado de 1995, art. 171.
100 VAN COTT, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION, supra note 84, at 176; see also 1967 Constitution with
1994 reforms and 1995 agreed text, supra note 98.
101 TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLE VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY 180
(2000).
102 Donna Lee Van Cott, Constitutional Reform in the Andes: Redefining Indigenous-State
Relations, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY AND
DEMOCRACY 45, 53 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002). [Hereinafter Van Cott, Constitutional Reform]
103 Id.
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Bolivian Congress held traditional indigenous practices.
“At the end of 1994, the first one hundred children graduated from a pilot
program of bilingual education in Aymara, Quechua or Guarani, and
Spanish. The President reaffirmed his commitment to teaching all children
in both their native language and Spanish.”104 In 1995, Bolivia held its firstever nation-wide municipal elections.
Indigenous and campesino
candidates won 28.6 percent of municipal council seats.105
The Sánchez de Lozada administration ushered in a program of state
modernization which recognized the multicultural nature of Bolivia and
promoted greater participation by grass-roots organizations in its attempts
to enshrine decentralization.106 But the constitutional reforms were
undertaken without the creation of a directly elected constituent assembly,
for fear of empowering the indigenous and campesino populations too
much.107 “Bolivia has a long history of constituent assemblies, usually
convoked by dictators to legitimate and institutionalize their rule.
Constituent assemblies or national conventions previously, since 1826, had
spawned fourteen new constitutions.”108
Indigenous groups took advantage of a program by the national
government called the Popular Participation Law (“LPP”),109 which sought
to increase democracy in the country, by forming municipalities that offer
indigenous groups greater opportunities for self-determination.110 “The
U.S. Agency for International Development [ ] invest[ed] fourteen million
dollars between 1995 and 2003 to support the popular participation
process.”111
The reforms did not live up to the aspirations of the indigenous people
for territorial and political autonomy,112 as there were no specific functions,
nor independent means to raise taxes to support sub-mayors in the newly
104 Steven E. Hendrix, Advancing Toward Privatization, Education Reform, Popular Participation,
and Decentralization: Bolivia’s Innovation in Legal and Economic Reform, 1993-1997, 14 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 679, 697 (1997).
105 Van Cott, Constitutional Reform, supra note 102, at 58.
106 Id. at 53.
107 Sieder, supra note 26.
108 VAN COTT, FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION, supra note 84, at 132. “The number of constitutions that
Bolivia has had – a total of eleven in the nineteenth century – reflects attempts by different presidents to
legitimize themselves through a symbolic refounding of the republic.” Barragán, supra note 20, at 67.
109 Participación Popular, Ley No. 1551 (Apr. 20, 1994) (Bol.),
http://www.del.org.bo/info/archivos/ley%201551.pdf [Popular Participation Law].
110 Hendrix, supra note 104, at 704.
111 Id. at 706.
112 Van Cott, Constitutional Reform, supra note 92, at 55. “Although the political reforms of the
1990s promised to make access to political institutions easier for all Bolivian citizens...the legacy of
racism was recontextualized but not erased by those reforms. Racism continues to structure and limit
participation, making it impossible for many Bolivians to exercise their political rights.” POSTERO, supra
note 40, at 6.
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recognized indigenous districts.113 But the reforms did assist in securing
collective property rights, with which indigenous peoples could construct
their identities and try to establish autonomy.114 In 1995, the Government
formed a “National Committee for the International Decade of Indigenous
Peoples” to plan, evaluate, coordinate, and publicize programs to increase
self-determination, and to set goals and objectives.”115 “[T]here is a
vigilance committee for each city that is typically comprised of a locally
selected representative from each municipal district.”116 Vigilance
committee members are often selected by the communities themselves in
accordance with local customs.117
In sum, Bolivian indigenous organisations were unable to link
constitutional recognition of their authorities and territories to a meaningful
level within the political and territorial administration, that is, a level at
which functional powers and state resources would be accessible (the only
gains made in this respect related to the exercise of customary law and the
administration of bilingual educational programmes).118
Some collective ownership over lands was recognized.119 Many of these
changes paralleled the changes that other Latin American countries had
undertaken.120
The regime following Sánchez de Lozada – that of former dictator
General Hugo Banzer - gave the LPP a much lower priority. Instead of
focusing on multiculturalism, the Banzer regime focused on economic
approaches to reducing systemic poverty in Bolivia. The Banzer regime
also dismantled the governmental apparatus to promote decentralization,
pushing it instead to a commission (and not a vice-ministry). Agrarian land
reforms based on the constitutional reforms and a 1996 agrarian law were
113 Van Cott, Constitutional Reform, supra note 102, at 55.
114
The LPP fulfilled some of the functions of a policy of recognition in that it addressed centuries
of discrimination by naming indigenous people as citizens and in the process fueled their
expectations of participation. This remained mostly symbolic, however, because the LPP did
not produce a meaningful redistribution of resources or radically challenge the structured
inequalities of power...the law was not part of a democraticizing effort intended to benefit the
poor. Rather, it was part of an overarching strategy on the part of a neoliberal government that
intended the reforms as a palliative for the larger structural adjustments it imposed.
POSTERO, supra note 40, at 15.
115 Hendrix, supra note 104, at 704.
116 Id. at 705.
117 Id.
118 Van Cott-Constitutional Reform, supra note 102, at 57.
119 Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Ley No. 1715 (Oct. 18, 1996) (Bol.) [National Service
for Agrarian Reform Law].
120 Fromherz, supra note 27, at 1375 n.165.
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slowed down, thereby satisfying the landowning elite of Bolivia’s lowlands,
one of whom was Banzer himself.121
In addition to these economic reforms, President Banzer turned his
attention to criminal and indigenous justice matters. Under Law No. 1970,
the Bolivian Congress republished the Code of Criminal Procedure on
March 25, 1999. A new Article 28 provided, in part, that:
[A] criminal action will be concluded when the crime or offense is
committed within an indigenous or peasant community by one of its
members against another, and its natural authorities will have
resolved the conflict in conformity with their Indigenous Customary
Law, whenever said resolution is not contrary to the fundamental
rights and personal guarantees established by the Constitution.122
Indigenous justice had finally been recognized in the laws of Bolivia.
But notwithstanding
[t]his provision on ‘community justice,’ despite its unheralded
eventual appearance, had been the subject of intense controversy
within the Bolivian Congress ever since the possibility of adding an
‘indigenous rights’ provision to Bolivian law had been raised during
the presidency of Gonzales Sánchez de Lozada during the mid-1990s.
The most common line of critique was anchored in a thinly veiled
racist discourse that contrasted the supposed ‘savagery’ of ‘Indian
law’ with the nobility of Bolivia’s constitution.123
It was clear that over the decades, indigenous customary law was still
viewed as inferior to the laws imported from Europe, and that Bolivia’s
ratification of the International Labour Organization Convention on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Convention No. 169 of 1989 (“ILO
Convention No. 169”)124 meant little in practice. By the time Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada was elected for a second term in 2002, the controversy
over the export of natural gas from Bolivia to the United States through
Chile became the hot button issue that upset the indigenous communities.125
It was not long before the continued popular uprising against Sánchez de
121 Van Cott-Constitutional Reform, supra note 102, at 57.
122 Goodale, supra note 25, at 17.
123 Id.
124 Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention No. 169, Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent
Countries
(Sept.
5,
1991),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.
125 “[T]he faces on the front lines of the 2003 demonstrations were overwhelmingly indigenous,
especially in El Alto, where most of the violence occurred. Indian pride in the results of the gas war was
palpable.” Postero, supra note 40, at 4; see also BENJAMIN DANGL, THE PRICE OF FIRE: RESOURCE
WARS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN BOLIVIA 75-90 (2007).
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Lozada’s second administration ended with the embattled President
resigning, fleeing the country, leaving the Vice-President, Carlos Mesa, to
be sworn in to lead the government. Evo Morales, a member of Bolivia’s
Congress, and very close runner up in the Presidential elections of 2002 won
a landslide victory (54% of the vote) in the elections of December 2005,
ushering a new era for Bolivia. He became the first president of indigenous
background to assume the presidency. And the changes that would follow
– from nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry to the implementation
of indigenous justice mechanisms – would revolutionize Bolivia and chart
a new course for indigenous self-determination throughout the developing
world.
II. CHANGES IN BOLIVIA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE MORALES
GOVERNMENT
A. The New Political Constitution of the State of Bolivia
During President Evo Morales Ayma’s first term as President of Bolivia,
he advocated the enactment of a New Constitution that would reconcile the
differences of the indigenous population. The Constitution of the
Plurinational State of Bolivia was enacted on February 7, 2009 by President
Evo Morales.126 The controversial part of the New Constitution of Bolivia
revolves around rights for the indigenous population and what this means
for the people of Bolivia. Despite its length, there remain a number of
questions regarding the status of the indigenous population as a selfautonomous body. Thus, it is important to outline the pertinent parts of the
New Constitution of Bolivia in order to analyze how they may conflict with
Bolivia’s international obligations.
The theme of the New Constitution is clear throughout the 411 articles:
the recurring role of the government and strengthening of indigenous rights.
Bolivia is formally introduced as a plurinational country; a country with a
“plural composition” of different peoples of ethnic backgrounds.127
Immediately after introducing the new plurinational nature of Bolivia, the
New Constitution declares the self-autonomy of the indigenous
population.128 Adamant in recognizing the rights of the indigenous, the New
Constitution states that they are a separate autonomous group but are still
126 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at Preámbulo.
127 Id. at art. 1.
128 Id. at art. 2.
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required to abide by the New Constitution of Bolivia.129 These indigenous
peoples and the non-indigenous peoples are all considered to be Bolivians
under the New Constitution.130 The rights of the indigenous people are
formally delineated in its own chapter in the New Constitution.131 Article
30 encourages the indigenous to preserve their traditional and cultural
identity.132 In particular, under Bolivian law, indigenous people are allowed
to formulate and exercise their own political, legal, and economic
systems.133 The question that begs to be answered is how the relationship
between the Bolivian legal system and the indigenous legal system evolves.
How will the Bolivian government reconcile the differences between the
two legal systems? Moreover, how much regulation will the government
provide for indigenous self-autonomy? For example, the New Constitution
of Bolivia encourages the indigenous people to continue using traditional
medicine.134 However, the law (assuming Bolivian law) will be a regulator
of traditional medicine to ensure the quality of the service.135
Moreover, the New Constitution of Bolivia corroborates with the
international human rights treaties that Bolivia has ratified thus far: the
fundamental right to life guarantees against torture and slavery,136 right to
work in decent conditions and to have decent living conditions,137 and right
to self-determination in regards to political affiliation,138 cultural
affiliation,139 religion,140 and even sexual orientation.141
The New Constitution of Bolivia outlines the due process rights of all
detained persons142 and the rights to communicate with a public defender.143
Even indigents are protected; sanctions of all types must be actually based
on a law existing prior to the commission of the punishable act.144 Also,
only a competent judicial authority has the jurisdiction to execute these
129 Id. at art. 3.
130 Id.
131 See id. at Título dos, Capítulo quarto [Title II, Chapter IV].
132 See id. at art. 30.
133 Id. at art. 30(14).
134 Id. at art. 42.
135 Id. at art. 42(3).
136 Id. at art. 15.
137 Id. at art. 46-48.
138 Id. at art. 26.
139 Id. at art. 21.
140 Id. at art. 21(3).
141 Id. at art. 14(2). “The plurinational Bolivia that emerges from the text of the constitution is a
profoundly liberal one based on intercultural respect, human rights, and the rule of law.” Postero, et al.,
Bolivia’s Challenge to “Colonial Neoliberalism,” in NEOLIBERALISM INTERRUPTED: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND CONTESTED GOVERNANCE IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 25, 44 (Mark Goodale & Nancy
Postero eds, 2013) [hereinafter POSTERO, NEOLIBERALISM].
142 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 115(2).
143 Id. at art. 73.
144 Id. at art. 116(2).
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sanctions.145 But this begs the question of what the qualifications of a
competent judicial authority are. Further, if the New Constitution of Bolivia
recognizes two legal systems that may simultaneously be in place,146 then
are both the modern and indigenous legal systems instruments of a
competent judicial authority?
The New Constitution of Bolivia unequivocally declares the existence
of three judicial courts: the Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction, the AgroEnvironmental Court, and the Rural Native Indigenous Jurisdiction.147
Though the Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction and the indigenous jurisdiction
share the same hierarchy,148 the court that defends all constitutional
guarantees is the Plurinational Constitutional Court.149 Thus, this suggests
that the government exhibits authority that far exceeds that of the
indigenous courts.150 Further, the indigenous courts are allowed to apply
their own principles and customs to the legal system.151 However, they must
abide by all the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the New Constitution
of Bolivia.152 Otherwise, the Constitution’s guarantee of indigenous rights
does exist: aside from the rights mentioned previously, the indigenous
population can create a self-governing entity and create laws and statutes in
accordance to the New Constitution of Bolivia.153
145 Id. at art. 117(1).
146 Id. at art. 119(1). Cf. Anna Barrera, Turning Legal Pluralism into State-Sanctioned Law:
Assessing the Implications of the New Constitutions and Laws in Bolivia and Ecuador, (German Institute
for Global and Area Studies Research Programme: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems,
Working Paper No. 176, Aug. 2011, at 12) (comparing the manner in which Bolivia and Ecuador have
addressed the challenges posed by the official recognition of the coexistence of a plurality of legal orders
since the adoption of their latest respective constitutions and exploring the new challenges that come to
the fore):
Bolivia has also established a long list of legal areas for which indigenous authorities may not
undertake adjudication, including public and private international law (crimes against
humanity, crimes affecting the security of the state, terrorism, trade), criminal law (corruption,
the trafficking of human beings, arms, or drugs), or tariff law.
147 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 179(1).
148 Id. at art. 179(2).
149 Id. at art. 179(3).
150 Bolivia Judge Vote: Void Ballot Papers Dominate Poll, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15330703. In his effort to encourage democracy in the
judicial system, President Morales initiated the first ever ballot election of top judges. Id. Some
indigenous people responded by spoiling their ballots or leaving it blank. Id.
151 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 190.
152 Id.
153 Id. at art. 292.
One might also wonder why the material competence of indigenous authorities remains
confined to legal issues that they “traditionally” used to address. Considering the highly
dynamic and flexible nature of indigenous legal practices – which has facilitated their
adaptation to the living conditions and evolution of indigenous communities for centuries – it
seems inappropriate that indigenous authorities are now viewed as incapable of finding
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These indigenous rights, as declared by the New Constitution of Bolivia,
still give pause because there are specific limits addressing the problem of
the recent community justice efforts championed by the indigenous people.
Instead, there is a general declaration of the Plurinational Constitutional
Court’s supremacy that is elected by all peoples of Bolivia.154 Specifics are,
however, left out, leaving it for the Constitutional Court to interpret at a later
date.
Under the New Political Constitution of the State of Bolivia, “Bolivia’s
36 indigenous tribes will be given ‘priority’ over citizens of European
descent when the revenue from these gas fields is distributed.”155 Moreover,
in order to work in the civil service, government employees must speak
Spanish in addition to one of the 36 indigenous languages of the country.
The New Constitution allowed Morales to seek a second consecutive fiveyear term and gave him the power to dissolve Congress. The previous
Constitution had limited presidents to a single term. Other changes to the
Constitution furthered indigenous rights, strengthened state control over
Bolivia’s natural resources, and enforced a limit on the size of private
landholdings.
On January 25, 2009, the people of Bolivia voted in a national
referendum to approve the New Political Constitution of the State of
Bolivia, which was overwhelmingly passed.156 Some 59% of the people
voted in favor of the new social pact for the country.157 But the majority of
voters around Bolivia’s so-called expanded Media Luna (Half Moon) – the
departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, Pando and Chuquisaca – long
bastions of separatist sentiment, voted to reject the new Constitution.158
B. The Vice-Ministry of Community Justice and the Implementation
adequate solutions for the recent or future problems of their constituents.
Barrera, supra note 146, at 13.
154 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 196.
155 Gareth Rubin, Bolivia Faces Crisis as Evo Morales Wins Referendum, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan.
26,
2009,
3:13
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/bolivia/4346584/Bolivia-faces-crisis-asEvo-Morales-wins-referendum.html.
156 Hannah Strange, Evo Morales Wins Vote on Constitution in Bolivia, THE TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009,
12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article1999270.ece.
157 Matthew Taylor, Evo Morales Hails ‘new Bolivia’ as Constitution is Approved, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/bolivia.
158 Rubin, supra note 155. “Right wing critics, especially the lowlands civic committees and their
militants, call Morales an authoritarian and liken him to Venezuela’s Chávez.” POSTERO,
NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 141, at 51. See also LINDA C. FARTHING & BENJAMIN H. KOHL, EVO’S
BOLIVIA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 45 (2014): “[T]he regional passion for autonomy has also led some
media luna residents to no longer see themselves as Bolivians but rather as cambas (lowlanders) or
Cruceños (from Santa Cruz).”
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of Indigenous Customary Law
The Bolivian Vice-Ministry of Community Justice159 has worked to
“legally recognize and regulate ancient indigenous community justice
practices.”160 This Ministry was formed in 2006 by President Evo Morales
and he appointed an indigenous Andean, Vellentin Ticona, to the Ministerial
post.161 Assuming his duty as Minister, Ticona took the initiative to meet
with various leaders of the National Counsel of the Ayllus, Markas, and
Qullasuyu indigenous communities to put together workshops and seminars
in an effort to “create a consensus among indigenous groups as to how the
community justice regulations should look.”162 Minister Ticona publically
stated his desire to restructure the current justice system in order to make
community justice options a possible alternative to the current system.163 In
response to this new program, the majority Movement to Socialism (MAS)
Congress responded favorably.164
The traditional justice mechanisms in the new “Plurinational State of
Bolivia” have not undergone radical changes.
However, perhaps
symbolically, the social transformation of the Plurinational State became a
formal political expression that sets the stage for the democratic cultural
revolution of the Morales Administration.
In late 2006, a bill was drafted to assure the recognition of the
indigenous-ancestral-communitary justice (a political-indigenous unit
based in the actual occupied territory) and campesino-communitary justice,
the latter which is fundamentally a land labor union conflict-solving system.
The bill recognized the indigenous or the campesinos’ right to political and
judicial self-government. However, this self-government can only act in
observance of the fundamental rights of the New Constitution of Bolivia
(approved by referendum on January 25, 2009).165 Judicial indigenouscampesino authorities can take actions in solving conflicts between citizens
(no matter the ancestral or political status) only if the conflict occurred
159 The “Viceministerio de Justicia Indígena Originaria Campesina” or the Vice-Ministry of
Indigenous, Original Peoples, and Farmworkers Justice.
160 Bolivia: Morales establishes new Ministry of Community Justice, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/bolivia-morales-establishes-new-ministrycommunity-justice.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. “[A] process through which theft, land conflicts, marital conflicts, or more serious crimes,
are adjudicated and sanctioned by community councils.” Id.
164 Id.
165 Ley de Justicia Comunitaria de los pueblos indígenas-originarios y comunidades campesinas,
MPR-DGGP Nº. 393/2006, Dec. 31, 2006.
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inside the indigenous-campesino territorial unit.166
The law - “Ley de Justicia Comunitaria de los pueblos indígenasoriginarios y comunidades campesinas” - was passed into law on December
29, 2010,167 and makes the new legal system mandatory for indigenous and
campesino communities.168 Article 10 of the law, titled “Carácter
Obligatorio” provides that:
The indigenous jurisdiction for the indigenous and campesinos that
reside in their communities, where they have been produced and
where authorities exist and customary procedures are known by their
own uses and customs. The decisions of the authorities and
indigenous and campesino communities in the exercise of their own
customary law are mandatory and must be respected and accepted by
the parties to a conflict, and all the previewed authorities in the
Bolivian juridical order. (author’s translation)169
At the writing of this Article, there have been no serious studies to
document any standards and procedures for the resolution of conflicts in
indigenous or campesino communities in Bolivia. Nor were there any
academic, political, or judicial debates about this bill. No real studies were
undertaken but several opinion pieces have been published.170
166 Id. at art. 8.
167 Ley No 073 de Deslinde Jurisdiccional de 29 de diciembre de 2010, sobre la administración de
justicia ordinaria y justicia indígena. See Bolivia aprobó una peligrosa ley de justicia indígena, INFOBAE
AMERICA, June 8, 2010, http://www.infobae.com/2010/06/09/1000393-bolivia-aprobo-una-peligrosaley-justicia-indigena/.
168 Ley de Justicia Comunitaria de los pueblos indígenas-originarios y comunidades campesinas,
MPR-DGGP Nº. 393/2006, Dec. 31, 2006, art. 6.
169 INSTRUMENTOS INTERNACIONALES Y DOCUMENTOS ANDINOS SOBRE ADMINISTRACIÓN DE
JUSTICIA
INDÍGENA,
ART.
10
CARÁCTER
OBLIGATORIO,
http://portal.uasb.edu.ec/UserFiles/369/File/PDF/CentrodeReferencia/Temasdeanalisis2/administracio
nyjusticiaindigena/documentos/anteproyectobolivia.pdf:
La jurisdicción indígena es obligatoria para los indígenas y campesinos que residan en sus
comunidades, en donde se haya producido el hecho y en donde existan autoridades indígenas y
procedimientos consuetudinarios reconocidos por sus usos y costumbres. Las decisiones de las
autoridades de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas-campesinas, en ejercicio de su propio
Derecho Consuetudinario, son obligatorias y deben ser respetadas y acatadas por las partes
intervinientes en el conflicto, y por toda autoridad prevista en el ordenamiento jurídico
boliviano.
170 Jorge Machicado, Conductas reprobadas y penas en la comunidad, LA RAZON, Sept. 24, 2013,
http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?_url=/la_gaceta_juridica/Conductas-reprobadas-penascomunidad_0_1912008866.html. See also Idón Moisés Chivi Vargas, La Jurisdicción Indígena
Originaria Campesina desde la perspectiva de la descolonización del derecho, BOLPRESS.COM, Jan. 14,
2010, http://www.bolpress.com/?Cod=2010011413. The Bolivian government provided a report to the
United Nations on its efforts to protect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples, but without fully
detailing the traditional justice system being implemented. INFORME DEL GOBIERNO DEL
ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA SOBRE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS
INDIGENAS, Jan. 2011, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/session_10_Bolivia.pdf (last
visited on Mar. 5, 2017).
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The most important reform in the Bolivian legal system recognized the
political traditions among campesinos and indigenous populations as
territorial units. Thus, indigenous or campesinos communities can be
upgraded from districts to municipalities as well as to sub-regions.
Moreover, they can all begin to experiment with self-government, allowing
the influence and control of the nine regions in Bolivia to increase while
diminishing the relation to state institutions.
On August 2, 2009, President Morales ruled by decree that until August
23, all the indigenous communities interested in being activated as a selfgoverning unit must make a formal request to the National Electoral Court
(Plurinational Electoral Organ) for a local referendum when the option of
indigenous autonomy status is tested.171 The new geopolitical units became
thirty-seven extra competencies. Those competencies were described in a
law for autonomies and decentralization presented in July 2010 by the
Decentralization Ministry.172 Legislative projects have been structured
(only by the Executive) without a political or technical debate that was
inherited by the Bolivian Congress in order to reshape the Plurinational
State.
The objective of the institutionalization and regulation of legal
pluralism is not simply to recognize indigenous jurisdiction; it aims
to reduce the backlog in the national system and provide for a cheaper
and swifter administration of justice. Furthermore, in various
countries the incorporation of indigenous jurisdiction reflects an
attempt to eliminate other forms of extra-institutional conflict
resolution and violence.173
In other words, community justice policies are meant to curtail
vigilantism, not to encourage it.174 According to the Vice-Minister of
Community Justice in 2009, such justice “is a system of norms and
procedures that regulate the social life of the indigenous peoples and contain
171 Decreto Supremo Nº 231, Aug. 2, 2009, http://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N231.xhtml.
172
Decreto
Supremo
Nº
0802,
July
19,
2009,
http://anterior.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/normas/verGratis_gob/139034.
173 Assies, supra note 10, at 13.
174 For Leila Chirayath, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock, (referring mostly to African
countries), customary systems of law have been “seeded into communities by national or regional
governments for a variety of reasons: . . . preempting vigilantism in communities that feel marginalized
by existing procedures.” Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the
Plurality
of
Justice
Systems,
9
(2005),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/4773831118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf.
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some principles that are not contemplated in ordinary justice.”175 The
distinctive elements are that “the justice of this type is free, public,
preventive, oral, reparatory and immediate.”176
In the aftermath of the high-profile lynching of three off-duty police
officers in Epizana, Deputy Interior Minister Ruben Gamarra told Reuters
that “community justice has nothing to do with lynchings. “It’s to resolve
minor disputes between neighbors. In no way does it mean physical
punishment, much less an assassination.’”177 Clearly, things remain in flux
and uncertainty surrounds where competencies lie. Simultaneously, there
are increasing trends towards the use and execution of indigenous justice in
Bolivia, particularly in the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz Departments. The
lynch mob fills the vacuum left by the state, where it is unwilling or unable
to exact justice. For Professor Daniel Goldstein, this form of self-help is
directly attributable to the neoliberal economic model embraced in the
1990s during the first presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.178 The
lynchings are “ritual expressions of belonging that act to render the actors
visible to the state and call attention to the neoliberal state’s neglect of their
rights as citizens.”179
Police corruption also leads to vigilantism, further weakening the
monopoly of force that the Bolivian state should exercise.
The extortion committed against crime victims and their families by
the national police represents another form of Bolivian privatization,
in this case the privatization of public functions by the very personnel
charged with their execution. Police corruption converts the public
administration of justice into a private resource that maintains both
individual police officers, and, ironically, the police institution
175 “De acuerdo con el viceministro del área, Valentín Ticona, esta justicia ‘es un sistema de
normas y procedimientos que regulan la vida social de los pueblos indígenas y contiene algunos
principios que no contempla la justicia ordinaria’” (translation by author). Justicia Comunitaria Cambia
de Nombre Para Mejorar Imagen, EJU: POLÍTICA (Mar. 30, 2009, 10:02 A.M),
http://eju.tv/2009/03/justicia-comunitaria-cambia-de-nombre-para-mejorar-imagen/.
176 “En su opinión, estos elementos distintivos son que ‘la justicia de este tipo es gratuita, pública,
preventiva, oral, reparadora e inmediata.’” (translation by author). Id.
177 Reuters, Three Police Officers Lynched, supra note 37.
178 See generally Daniel M. Goldstein, “In our own Hands”: Lynching, Justice and the Law in
Bolivia, in 30 AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 22-43 (2003) (“[J]ust a few weeks prior to his forced resignation
in 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada responded to increasingly strident calls for improved ‘citizen
security’ in Bolivia by announcing a plan (never implemented) to create ‘anti-crime gangs’ (pandillas
anticrimen) in various Bolivian cities. These gangs, officially known as ‘youth citizen security brigades’
(brigadas juveniles de seguridad ciudadana), would have consisted of young people who would patrol
certain zones of the city, confronting other, criminal youth gangs and somehow preventing them from
committing crimes.”). Goldstein-Flexible Justice, supra note 28, at 259.
179 POSTERO, supra note 40, at 18.
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itself.180
The proliferation of private security guards, so pervasive in other parts
of Latin America, is part of this trend.181 In the region, long are the
memories of surveillance societies that came with secret police files, torture,
and disappearance or exile. In the aftermath of military dictatorships,
societies are left scarred by the wholesale slaughter of their citizens. With
the military having less of a governance role more recently, the people,
dispossessed by the globalization process, take to the streets in protests,
resulting in violence, destruction, and petty theft.
Multinational
corporations and the international financial institutions are increasingly
viewed as the enemies, often viewed as the foreign investors who increase
the prices for basic services on which everyone depends.182
Neoliberal violence, including physical violence produced by the
military, police personnel, private security guards, and lynch mobs, and the
structural violence of poverty and insecurity, are all grounded in the reforms
of the neoliberal state and the cultural logic of privatization, flexibility, and
self-help that accompanies them.183
The wholesale rejection of the Western tradition of criminal procedure
and the battle against the anti-corporatist agendas are conflated into a
general narrative that rejects Western or developed countries’ ideas, aid
programs, and development strategies and a retrenchment into exercises of
the right of self-determination with some legal basis for the actions.184
180 Goldstein, Flexible Justice, supra note 28, at 256.
181 Katherine Corcoran, Private firms filling Latin America’s security gap, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Nov. 26, 2014, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-private-firms-filling-latin-americassecurity-gap-2014nov26-story.html. Adam Blackwell, The Unregulated and Threatening Growth of
Private Security in Latin America, Wilson Center Latin American Program (June 2015),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Private%20Security%20in%20Latin%20America.
pdf.
182
Time and time again global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) advised and coerced Bolivia to make their theory Bolivia’s practice. Successive
governments, led by a small and affluent national elite, adopted the rules wholesale, out of both
ideology and self-interest. They privatized public water systems and the nation’s valuable gas
and oil reserves into foreign corporate hands. They sold off state-owned businesses, also to
foreign companies. They cut public spending and raised taxes in order to pay off foreign debt.
Jim Shultz, Conclusion: What Bolivia Teaches Us, in DIGNITY AND DEFIANCE: STORIES FROM
BOLIVIA’S CHALLENGE TO GLOBALIZATION 291, 291-2 (Jim Shulte & Melissa Crane Draper eds., 2008).
183 Goldstein, Flexible Justice, supra note 28, at 259.
184
In its visceral, inescapable visual immediacy, vigilante lynching in Cochabamba is a kind of
spectacle, a performance whose audience includes both potential criminals and the state itself.
For people long excluded from the official realms of political and social life and unable to have
their demands registered by the legally constituted authorities, taking ‘justice’ into their own
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The next part of this Article explores Bolivia’s legal obligations under
international human rights treaties and the manner in which parts of the
indigenous justice system may breach some of these provisions.
III. BOLIVIA’S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Bolivia’s steps toward modernization over the last century include its
participation in international treaties and covenants regarding human rights.
However, these international obligations may come into conflict with the
obligations it owes its indigenous peoples. The Bolivian Government,
under President Evo Morales, will have to buffer the increasing tensions
between modern obligations and ancient tribal justice. The two different
types of international obligations outlined here are those signed within the
Americas and those that include the rest of the global community. Part A
includes the relevant Inter-American treaties that Bolivia has signed,
ratified, and deposited. Part B includes the relevant international treaties
that create obligations to which the Bolivian Government must adhere. Part
C is an outline of the parts of the new Bolivian Constitution that pertain to
human, women, political, and economic rights issues. Finally, Part D
attempts to summarize the reality of the Constitutional effect on the
indigenous population.
C. Treaties of the Americas
1. American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the
American Convention” or “IACHR”) was established in San Jose, Costa
Rica in 1969.185 However, the treaty did not enter into force until July 18,
1976. Bolivia ratified the treaty on June, 20, 1979. Further, the country
also declared adherence to the treaty in a formal letter in 1993.186 The
earliest treaty of its kind, the IACHR is a predecessor to the international
treaties to which Bolivia would later accede.
hands is a dramatic way to capture the attention of an inattentive audience.
DANIEL M. GOLDSTEIN, THE SPECTACULAR CITY: VIOLENCE AND PERFORMANCE IN URBAN BOLIVIA
25 (2004).
185 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica” (B-32)), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-32.html [hereinafter The American Convention].
186 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica, Treaty Reference Guide, http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/b-32.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013).
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Though the treaty advocates abolishing capital punishment, it
recognizes that many signatories to the treaty have yet to abolish the death
penalty. Instead, the treaty places restrictions on the types of crimes that
can be punishable by death.187 The death penalty cannot be inflicted for
political offenses or any common crimes.188 Moreover, only adults over
the age of eighteen can be punished with the death penalty. 189
The treaty requires signatory parties to treat prisoners with dignity.190
Cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment is forbidden.191 The
treaty forbids slavery yet allows forced labor if authorized by competent
judicial authorities.192 An individual’s due process rights are also fully
protected under the treaty.193
Only after adhering to the American Convention did Bolivia sign
several other international treaties submitted to the United Nations. These
international agreements echo much of what the American Conventions
strive to achieve. Thus, the conflicts that arise from Bolivia’s obligations
to the international treaties will also be found in the American Convention.
Because there are more international agreements than American
conventions, this paper will delineate these conflicts in Part D instead.
2. American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
The American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (hereinafter
“the American Torture Convention”) was adopted at Cartagena de Indias
in Colombia by the Organization of American States in 1985.194 The
agreement came shortly after the adoption of the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(hereinafter “CAT”) and is essentially the same in its objectives. Bolivia
signed the American Torture Convention the day of its adoption, but it was
not until November 2006 that the country ratified the treaty.195 In contrast,
Bolivia ratified the CAT in 1999.196 Because of the similarities between
187 The American Convention, supra note 185, art. 4, ¶ 2.
188 Id. art. 4, ¶ 4.
189 Id. art 4, ¶ 5.
190 Id. art. 5.
191 Id.
192 Id. art. 6.
193 Id. art. 7-11.
194 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/a-51.html [hereinafter Prevent and Punish Torture].
195 See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Treaty Reference Guide,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/a-51.html. (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
196 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force May 12, 1999),

36

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:1

the two agreements, the CAT will delineate the issues Bolivian law faces
in the new era.
D. Other International Treaties and Sources
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The basic foundation for human rights is reflected in the establishment
of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”). The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter “the Rome Statute”) was
adopted on July 17, 1998 to promote justice for international war crimes
such as genocide and other crimes against humanity.197 Embedded in the
Rome Statute is the delineation of what constitutes a crime against
humanity and the treatment of those who are charged with crimes against
humanity (in addition to crimes of aggression, war crimes and genocide).
The criminal law and procedure established by the Rome Statute is
reflected in many States’ domestic constitutions. Bolivia signed the treaty
in on July 17, 1998 and officially ratified the statute in June 27, 2002.198
The New Political Constitution of the State of Bolivia, which was
adopted by national referendum on January 29, 2009, reflects Bolivia’s
adherence to the definition of genocide in the Rome Statute. The Rome
Statute defines genocide as:
“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group
to another group.”199
In order to adhere to the Rome Statute, Bolivia began to draft the
implementation of the statute in its legislation in October of 2005.200
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003d679 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
197 Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202187/v2187.pdf [hereinafter, Rome Statute].
198 Rome Statute, United Nations Treaty Collection, Full Text and Details,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280025774 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
199 Rome Statute, supra note 197, art. 6.
200 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Anteproyecto de Ley de Adecuación Normativa
al ECPI [Bolivia Draft International Criminal Court (ICC) Implementation Bill],
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Bolivia_DraftImplementationBill_Oct05.pdf.
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According to the New Bolivian Constitution: “The crimes of genocide,
offenses against humanity, treason, and war crimes are not
extinguishable.”201
2. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment – including the Optional
Protocol
Bolivia signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment202 on February 4, 1985 and signed
its accession on April 12, 1999.203 In addition to the adherence of the
original CAT, Bolivia also signed a declaration establishing the
acknowledgment of the Committee Against Torture on February 14,
2006.204 This separate declaration is optional under Article 21 of the
Convention. This declaration allows Bolivia to enforce the provisions of
the Convention against any other State that has made the same
declaration.205 Other States may, likewise, enforce the provisions of the
convention against Bolivia as well.206 Bolivia also signed the Optional
Protocol of the CAT on May 22, 2006 and ratified the protocol on May 23,
2006.207
The CAT defines torture as any act in which severe pain or suffering
is intentionally inflicted on a person to either obtaining a confession or
information from him, or to punish him.208 The CAT also requires each
signed party “to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture.”209 CAT also requires that the act of
torture constitutes a criminal offense.210 The Bolivian Penal Code reflects
its support for the convention through subtle wording regarding torture and
201 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, art. 111.
202 Convention against Torture, supra note 196.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment,
Dec.
18,
2002,
2375
U.N.T.S.
1,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003d68b.
208 Convention against Torture, supra note 196, art. 1. See Richard P. Shafer, Construction and
Application of United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, or Punishment, 184 A.L.R. Fed. 385 (2003) (explaining the definition of torture in the CAT
and the application of torture, including the observation that the death penalty does not constitute as
torture).
209 Convention against Torture, supra note 196, art. 2(1).
210 Id. art. 4.
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cruel punishment.211 The code is defined as a progressive prison system that
aims for social rehabilitation, not for obtaining information, confession, or
a means of punishment. Prisoners who are illiterate will be taught a basic
education.212
Similar to many modern legal systems, the Bolivian Penal Code also has
discrete sentences for mayhem and murder, including the following: when
a person creates any danger of damage, he is liable for imprisonment of one
to four years.213 Homicide in general may be punished with five-twenty
years imprisonment,214 while murder requires at least thirty years of
imprisonment.215 Parricide, the murder of a parent, is also condemned to at
least thirty years.216
The Bolivian Penal Code provides that crimes of homicide result in
adequate imprisonment sentences. More specifically, the Bolivian Penal
Code is dotted with references to a rehabilitating criminal prison system.
Under Chapter III, Article 47, those who are convicted of crimes are not
deprived of basic human rights. 217
Despite cooperation and steps toward modernization, Bolivia is careful
not to complicate itself with treaties that may later create conflicts of
interest. An amendment to CAT in 1992 allowed one State to petition for a
new amendment to the CAT. If the proposed amendment is passed with a
two-thirds vote, then all States who signed the original CAT would also be
bound by the amendment.218 Bolivia has yet to sign the amendment, and
thus is not bound by any amendments proposed by any party to the
Convention.
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women – including Optional Protocol
Entered into force in 1989, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter “CEADW”)
211 Código Penal Boliviano. Sancionado por el Decreto Ley N° 10426, de 23 de agosto de 1972.
Incluye modificaciones según Ley N° 1768 de modificaciones al Codigo Penal y actualización según
Ley 2494 de 04 de agosto de 2003, http://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/bol/sp_bol-int-text-cp.html
[hereinafter the Bolivian Penal Code].
212 Id. art. 47.
213 Id. art. 208.
214 Id. art. 251.
215 Id. art. 252.
216 Id. art. 253.
217 Id. art. 47.
218 Amendments to articles 17 (7) and 18 (5) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1992 (not yet entered in
force), http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-9-a.en.pdf.
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represented advancement of women’s rights.219 Bolivia signed the treaty on
May 30, 1980 and later ratified it on June 8, 1990.220 The treaty aimed to
end discrimination against women, including modifying social and cultural
norms of men and women to eliminate the idea of inferiority or superiority
of one gender over the other.221 To eliminate prejudices, both sexes have to
be treated the same.
The Bolivian Penal Code makes it a crime to abandon a pregnant
woman,222 and imprisonment for this crime varies from six months to three
years.223 However, if the abandonment results in the crime of abortion,
infanticide, abandonment or exposure of the newborn, then imprisonment is
between one to five years.224 As implied previously, and unlike the United
States, abortion is a crime throughout the country. 225 The convention is
silent on the matter of abortion.
4. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
“ICCPR”) served to replicate and further expand the ideals of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.226 Adopted and open for ratification on
December 16, 1966, Bolivia did not accede to the ICCPR until August 12,
1982.227 Aside from repeating the essential human freedoms, the ICCPR
delineated inalienable due process rights of each individual. By signing the
treaty, the State guarantees that each person within its jurisdiction has
competent judicial, administrative, and legislative rights.228 The covenant
also reinstates the treaties regarding torture and cruel punishment and
slavery.229
219 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201249/volume-1249-I20378-English.pdf. [hereinafter CEADW].
220
United
Nations Treaty Collection, CEADW, Treaty
Reference Guide,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028000309d (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
221 CEADW, supra note 219, art. 5.
222 The Bolivian Penal Code, supra note 211, art. 250.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. art. 263.
226 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf
[hereinafter ICCPR].
227 United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Treaty
Reference Guide, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280004bf5 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2018).
228 ICCPR, supra note 226, at art. 2(3).
229 Id. art. 7-8.
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Bolivia’s acceptance of the Covenant is reflected in the country’s Penal
Code, which prohibits sentencing of a person of any penalty without being
heard by a court and judged under the country’s Criminal Procedure
Code.230 It is a constitutional guarantee that there be no condemnation
without trial and due process.231 Moreover, aligning with the ICCPR and
other treaties mentioned above, a person who is convicted or indicted of an
offense is entitled to be treated with due respect as a human being.232
Capital punishment may only be carried out by a court of competent
jurisdiction.233 However, the Covenant’s view on a “competent” court is
absent in a state where the indigenous peoples may carry out their own legal
authority. If capital punishment is given to an indigent, the ICCPR grants
the individual a right to seek pardon or commutation.234 The ICCPR’s
clarity in the gravity of capital punishment stems from the inherent belief
that a human has the inherent right to life that is protected by law.235
Along the lines of human rights, the ICCPR forbids any interpretation of
the Covenant that gives a group of people the right to perform an activity
that is aimed at the destruction of any of the rights provided by the
covenant.236 Moreover, there can be no restriction against the human rights
recognized by the ICCPR despite contradictions from the State’s law,
conventions, regulations or custom.237 These contradictions to human rights
are also those that this Article strives to determine. The ICCPR claims
certain human rights as superior to those rights delineated by the State’s
own laws. However, in recent Bolivian history, the law has been rapidly
strengthening the rights and competence of the Bolivian indigenous
people.238 The Bolivian Criminal Procedure Code now recognizes the
differences in the customary practices of the indigenous groups scattered
throughout Bolivia.239 In a discrete article, the code allows the resolution
of a dispute between members of an indigenous tribe using custom so long
230 Codigo de Procedimiento Penal No. 1970, art. 1, Ley del 25 de Marzo de 1999 [Criminal
Procedure
Code
No.
1970,
art.
1,
Law
of
Mar.
25,
1999]
http://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/bol/sp_bol-int-text-cpp.html [hereinafter CPC].
231 ICCPR, supra note 226, art. 1.
232 Id. art. 5.
233 Id. art. 6(2).
234 Id. art. 6(4).
235 Id. art. 6(1).
236 Id. art. 5.
237 Id. art. 5(2).
238 See, G.A. Res. 61/295 at 2, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Sept.
13
2007),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/295&referer=/english/&Lang=E
(parties of the United Nations formally recognize that indigenous people share all inherent and
fundamental human rights; Bolivia voluntarily signed the declaration despite the document being nonbinding) [hereinafter “DRIP”].
239 CPC, supra note 230, art. 28.
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as it does not contradict the fundamental rights provided by the
government.240 The passing of the New Bolivian Constitution only furthers
confusion of how the government may reconcile its international obligations
and its obligation to its citizens.
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter “CRC”)
recognizes the importance of ensuring a child’s welfare.241 Bolivia became
one of the signatory parties on July 25, 1990.242 Article III of the CRC
requires signed parties to ensure that each child under its jurisdiction
receives the “protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being,
taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her [] [when
enacting] all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.”243
Its protection of children’s rights is adapted into the penal code, making
it a crime for certain child-related offenses. All parents have a preliminary
duty of care for their children in which they must provide primary age
children with educational instruction.244 Neglect is also a punishable crime.
If a parent abandons a child of twelve years and younger, the parent is
punished with imprisonment between three months to two years.245 A
significant step toward modernization, the Bolivian Penal Code also
penalizes sexual relations with a child under seventeen years old.246
6. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
The Supplementary Convention to the 1926 Abolition of Slavery entered
into force on September 7, 1956.247 The Supplementary Convention aims
to eliminate slavery in all States that have signed the original Convention.248
Even in a State where slavery is not eliminated, it is a crime to force another
240 Id.
241 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201577/v1577.pdf.
242 Id. pmbl. n1.
243 Id. at art. 3(2).
244 The Bolivian Penal Code, supra note 211, at art. 249.
245 Id. at art. 278.
246 Id. art. 318.
247 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices
Similar
to
Slavery,
Sept.
7,
1956,
266
U.N.T.S.
3,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/slaverytrade.pdf.
248 Id. at art. 1.
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person into a servile status as punishment or for any reason.249 Bolivia
formally accepted the treaty on October 6, 1983.250
In the Bolivian Penal Code, Bolivia makes it a crime to reduce a person
to slavery or similar status.251 The penalty is two to eight years in prison.252
Furthermore, any person who deprives another of personal liberty is liable
for imprisonment of six months to two years.253 This distinct violation
against slavery or servile status will later run into conflict with indigenous
customs and practices that allow submitting a violator to servile status.
7. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
At the forefront of the government’s attempt to reconcile indigenous
judicial customs with international standards is the growing division among
ethnic Bolivians on economic and social issues. When the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter
“ICESCR”)254 was opened for signature on December 16, 1966, the rights
of indigenous people were not considered in the Covenant’s coverage.
However, the United Nations does recognize that indigenous peoples have
the right to all fundamental protections.255 Keeping the importance of that
notion, this Article provides some prominent regulations outlined by the
ICESCR that ensures every individual has the freedom to enjoy his or her
economic, social, and cultural rights.
Among the Covenant’s governing economic rights, the ICESCR ensures
that each individual has safe work conditions, sustainable work costs, and a
decent living to provide means of sustenance.256 Moreover, each individual
has the right to join labor unions to ensure the economic rights recognized
by the ICESCR.257 However, the reality of this may be compromised by the
type of work and racial tensions experienced by Bolivia’s indigenous
population.
249 Id. at art. 5.
250 United Nations Treaty Collection, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave
Trade,
and
Institutions
and
Practices
Similar
to
Slavery,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII4&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
251 The Bolivian Penal Code, supra note 211, at art. 292.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/volume-993-I-14531-English.pdf
3,
[hereinafter ICESCR].
255 See DRIP, supra note 238, pmbl.
256 ICESCR, supra note 254, at art. 7.
257 Id. at art. 8.
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Prior to the international recognition of women’s rights, the ICESCR
recognized that “special protection should be accorded to mothers during a
reasonable period before and after childbirth.”258 Akin to maternity leave,
mothers should be accorded with a salary for the duration before and after
childbirth.259 In furthering social rights, the ICESCR recognizes the
importance of education in cultivating a free society.260 Moreover, primary
education is compulsory and free for both sexes.261 It is also required that
everyone have equal access to a higher education.262
Though adopted at the same time as the ICCPR, the ICESCR is much
shorter in length. Perhaps because the ICESCR serves as a much more
generalized guideline, the economic, social, and cultural obligations for a
developing country are vastly different from that of a developed country.
Thus, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations mandates that
each signed party furnish reports outlining the implementations of ICESCR
into its legislature.263 Further, reports are to be furnished at different stages
and times decided by the Council for each signatory party.264 Bolivia’s last
response to the Economic and Social Council was in April 2008 in a report
to complement its latest periodic report submitted earlier in January 2007.265
In that report, Bolivia formulated its plan to “decolonize the justice
system.”266 The government is aware of the ethnic tensions that arise from
the lack of a pluralistic justice system.267
Thus, the New Constitution of Bolivia aims to promote a greater
participation from all people, especially those who have been traditionally
marginalized.268
The plan also seeks to remodel the method of
administrating justice because the current legal system is colonial and thus,
outdated.269 An important recognition concerns indigenous people and the
258 Id. at art. 10(2).
259 Id.
260 Id. at art. 13.
261 Id. at art.13(2)(a).
262 Id. at art. 13(2)(c).
263 Id. at art. 17.
264 Id.
265 U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: consideration of reports submitted by States parties in
accordance with article 16 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Replies by the Government of Bolivia to the list of issues (E/C.12/BOL/Q/2) to be taken up in connection
with the consideration of the combined second, third and fourth periodic reports of Bolivia concerning
the rights referred to in articles 1-15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, E/C.12/BOL/Q/2/Add.1 (30 April 2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/48d0c36c2.html.
266 Id. at art. 103 ¶21(a).
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at art. 103 ¶21(b).
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customary justice system. Although the plan advocates the use of an
indigenous justice system as an alternative means to settling disputes, it is
also silent on the issue of criminal matters. 270
8. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples
Though not a binding instrument, the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter “DRIP”) was adopted by 143
Member States of the United Nations on September 13, 2007.271 The DRIP
served as a standard of achievement to be pursued for each Member State.272
Bolivia has recognized these rights and is especially adamant in
implementing it in the country’s Political Constitution of the Plurinational
State of Bolivia.273
A recurring theme in the DRIP is the call for indigenous peoples to
achieve self-determination or self-autonomy.274 But in promoting selfgovernment, much like Bolivia is facing now, there is conflict between the
State and the indigenous self-government. Hence, the DRIP urges the State
to consult and cooperate with the indigenous peoples before it adopts and
implements legislative or administrative measures that may affect the
indigenous.275 Simultaneously, DRIP also clarifies its stance that although
the indigenous population should maintain their distinctive customs and
judicial systems, they also have to adhere with international human rights
standards.276 Ideally, the DRIP will eventually provide for cooperation
between the State and the indigenous government as conflicts are to
resolved by considering both international human rights and indigenous
legal systems.277
International Labour Organization Convention No. 169278 carried the
270 Id. at art. 103 ¶24(a)(ii).
271 143 states voted in favor, while there were 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia,
Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). Declaration on the rights of
indigenous peoples, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx (last visited on Aug. 18, 2017).
272 See DRIP, supra note 238. Indeed, DRIP served as a standard of achievement to be pursued
for each Member State.
273 See 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at Título dos, Capítulo quarto [Title II, Chapter
IV]. An entire chapter on indigenous due process rights is delineated in the New Constitution of Bolivia.
274 See DRIP, supra note 238, at art. 2 (indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy when they
exercise their self-determination right); Id. at. art. 34 (“indigenous peoples have the right to promote,
develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs…”).
275 Id. at art. 19.
276 Id. at art. 34.
277 Id. at art. 40.
278 ILO, PROGRAMME TO PROMOTE ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 - INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
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“basic theme of the right of indigenous peoples to live and develop by their
own designs as distinct communities.”279 This Convention helped
precipitate many constitutional reforms around Latin America in the last
two decades of the twentieth century. ILO Convention No. 169 is the most
definitive and accepted international legal instrument to provide the
underpinnings for legal pluralism. Reforms that provided for collective land
rights, traditional language and cultural rights, and justice practices were
integrated into the constitutional regimes of a variety of countries around
the region. ILO Convention No. 169 “generally enjoins [the] states to
respect indigenous peoples’ aspirations in all decisions affecting them.”280
The Convention requires governments to promote indigenous peoples’ own
institutions and initiatives and upholds “the right of indigenous peoples to
live and develop by their own designs as distinct communities.”281
The strongest doctrinal argument for international legal recognition of
claims by indigenous groups to some form of juridical self-determination
comes from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.282 This instrument focuses on indigenous societies as the holders
of rights, since the survival of Indigenous Peoples requires the recognition
and protection of core rights to self-determination, lands, resources, and
cultural integrity – rights that flow from the nature of an indigenous society
STANDARDS DEPARTMENT, INDIGENOUS & TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO
NO.
169,
at
81-2
(2009),
CONVENTION
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_106474
.pdf [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169]. “Indigenous peoples’ right to retain and develop their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions is a fundamental right under international human
rights law.” Id. at 49. “The existence of such institutions is also a core element in the description of
indigenous peoples.” Id. “Article 1(1) of the Convention No. 169 identifies indigenous people as those
who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions,
irrespective of their legal status.” Id. Moreover, “an effective implementation of internationally
recognized indigenous peoples’ rights [] requires that customs, customary law and legal systems of
indigenous people are recognized and acknowledged [].” Id. at 81. Though, “indigenous customs cannot
be justified if these are in violation of fundamental human rights.” Id. at 82; see also Michael Blakeney,
Protecting The Spiritual Beliefs Of Indigenous Peoples--Australian Case Studies, 22 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 391, 414 (2013). “The International Labour Organization (“ILO”) Convention No. 169
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which had entered into force on
September 5, 1991 called attention to the distinctive contribution of indigenous peoples to cultural
diversity and affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to self-identification.” Id. See generally Abigail
Griffith, Struggles in Latin America over rights of Indigenous and national priorities, SPERO NEWS (June
21,
2010),
http://www.speroforum.com/a/35271/Struggles-in-Latin-America-over-rights-ofIndigenous-and-national-priorities (stating that “the ILO agreement establishes a template of basic rights
for indigenous groups.”).
279 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 1, 7 (1991).
280 Id. at 7.
281 Id.
282 Gesell, supra note 19, at 654.
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and preserve its cultural and social cohesion.283 The Declaration addresses,
at several points, the rights of indigenous peoples to some forms of juridical
self-determination and recourse to customary legal systems. Article 5 of the
Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.284
The Declaration further provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain
their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality,
traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist,
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human
rights standards.285
9. American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
A final international legal instrument, although only “soft law,” that
addresses the substantive rights of indigenous groups to their own juridical
systems is the American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which was adopted under the auspices of the Organization of American
States on June 15, 2016286 The American Declaration states in Article
XXII(1) that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain
their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality,
traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist,
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human
rights standards.287
At the State and inter-State levels, there is to be integration of Indigenous
justice systems, for Article XXII(2) of the American Declaration states that
“indigenous law and legal systems shall be recognized and respected by the
national, regional and international legal systems.” 288 Article XXII(3) of the
283 Id.
284 DRIP, supra note 238, art. 4.
285 Id. at art. 34.
286 American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (adopted at the third plenary session,
held on June 15, 2016), http://www.narf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2016oasdeclaration-indigenous-people.pdf [hereinafter “American Declaration”].
287 Id. at art. XXII(1).
288 Id., art XXII(2). For changes over the years concerning the American Declaration, see Draft
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Declaration also states that
[t]he matters referring to indigenous persons or to their rights or
interests in the jurisdiction of each state shall be conducted so as to
provide for the right of the indigenous people to full representation
with dignity and equality before the law. Consequently, they are
entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection and benefit of the
law, including the use of linguistic and cultural interpreters.289
In addition, Article XIII(3) of the American Declaration provides that:
Indigenous people have the right to the recognition and respect for all
their ways of life, world views, spirituality, uses and customs, norms
and traditions, forms of social, economic and political organization,
forms of transmission of knowledge, institutions, practices, beliefs,
values, dress and languages, recognizing their inter-relationship as
elaborated in this Declaration.290
The framers of the American Declaration clearly intended that the
Indigenous peoples would have the right to participate in the incorporation
of indigenous legal systems into the organizational structures of the
states.291
As noted above, Bolivia has many human rights obligations under
international treaty law as well as those evidenced in various international
and regional declarations. Yet the Bolivian Government, through its New
Constitution and evolving legal order is also committed to providing
increasing autonomy for its indigenous peoples. 292 Often these two
tendencies create much conflict.
Human rights are thus at odds with more forms of cultural relativism.
Relativism is often invoked to set unique cultures apart from other
influences, to preserve the vestiges of human differences. It strikes
American
Declaration
on
the
Rights
of
Indigenous
Peoples,
OAS,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/activities/declaration.asp.
289 American Declaration, supra note 286, at art. XXII(3).
290 Id. at art XIII(3).
291 Id., art. XIV(2).
292
Where indigenous peoples are concerned, the issues of political and legal pluralism which, to
be sure, are only some aspects in the bundle of features that constitute ‘indigenousness,’ are
intimately related to the question of territory. Though the notion of territory often tends to be
reduced to rights to a habitat and its natural resources, a broader understanding would
encompass the effective scope and scale of self-government and autonomy in its various
dimensions.
Assies, supra note 10, at 18.
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to show that human integrity is so closely connected to cultural belief
and practice that judgment can stem only from ethnocentric views
and standards. Reform cannot be imposed without cultural
unraveling and social catastrophe. Human rights universalism, by
contrast, implied not just a tool to be used in defense of cultures but
a selective critique of them based upon antirelativist standards,
standards derived from philosophical and legal traditions alien to
many distinct societies. An implication of this view is that by seeking
shelter in human rights, indigenous leaders are unintentionally
invoking a form of universalism poised to bring about as much, or
more, cultural change as protection.293
The law that established justicia comunitaria, like the New Constitution
of Bolivia, which preceded it, is vague and replete of operational details,
either through poor drafting or by design. As such, we can see how justicia
comunitaria, although on paper an ideal to which to aspire in pluralistic
societies like Bolivia, can be less a panacea and more a major challenge to
basic human rights like equality before the law, and the right to due process.
It can also become an impediment to basic law and order in the wake of
communities resorting to mob violence.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAW AND
BOLIVIA’S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Some Direct Threats to the Separation of Powers, Due
Process and Other Fundamental Human Right
The very fundamentals of due process are less protected under justicia
comunitaria. There are omissions of some fundamental human rights – like
the right to life, the right not to be tortured, and the right of the defendant to
have counsel and to hear the evidence and charges of which he or she is
being accused.
That justicia comunitaria allows for corporal punishment should give us
pause. That criminal sanction should involve an actual physical punishment
of a human being seems archaic. One can argue that a lynching, the
whipping of someone, or the cutting of one’s hair are all violations of human
rights.294
The Washington D.C. based non-governmental organization, the Human
Rights Foundation (“HRF”), expressed its concern that the new Bolivian
293 RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF
IDENTITY 143 (2003)
294 HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 11.
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constitution grants equal standing to that justicia comunitaria:
Enshrining this system within the Bolivian constitution would hinder
individual rights otherwise guaranteed by both the existing
constitution and international treaties to which Bolivia is signatory.
HRF seeks to alert raise awareness about the contradictions contained
within the constitutional framework. While numerous critics of the
Morales government equate communal justice with lynching (a
practice that has dramatically increased since 2005), HRF does not
consider communal justice, as understood by the Bolivian
government, to be lynching. However, the fact remains that
individuals carrying out lynching often claim to be doing so under
the system of communal justice.295
There is no due process. For the Human Rights Foundation, the Bolivian
authorities are advised to “draft and introduce legislation regulating the
administration of communal justice and limiting its scope.”296 The HRF
urges that in order for the communal justice process to exist, it should
incorporate the “[d]ue process presumption of innocence, the right to
defence [sic] counsel, the right to an impartial jury, the right to appeal, and
other basic guarantees of rule of law.”297 It is not surprising then that the
HRF concludes that:
The government must ensure that ordinary justice takes precedence
over any communal justice system in the country. There should be an
established procedure whereby ordinary judges and authorities may
review communal justice cases on behalf of victims seeking
redress.298
There is an unclear role set out for the Plurinational Tribunal, let alone
sources for its operation. The New Constitution contains “glaring
contradictions.”299 One instance is that, “it provides for a Plurinational
Tribunal that can hear and resolve only conflicts of competence between
ordinary and communal justice jurisdictions.”300 Moreover, although “the
Plurinational Tribunal cannot revise rulings or sentences, [] it can determine
whether particular rulings or sentences were issued by the proper legal
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
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authorities (ordinary or communal judges).”301
The Plurinational Tribunal seats an equal number of representatives from
both the communal and ordinary justice systems.302 However, the
qualifications differ between the two justice systems:
[W]here representatives of the ordinary justice system must be
lawyers with at least eight years of working experience and a proven
track record, communal justice representatives need only to have
practiced as authorities within their system. No other qualifications
are required. 303
Moreover, “Article 192 of the [] [new] constitution [of Bolivia]
establishes that communal justice decisions will be directly executed and
will not be subject to review by any other judicial authorities.”304 This is
hugely important and in direct contradiction of democratic theory dating
back to the Enlightenment.305 There is a danger that President Morales has
backed the Plurinational Tribunal with his own ideologically-aligned
jurists.306 Under the circumstances, it is important that community “justice
rulings be subject to review by ordinary courts.”307
“Ley de Justicia Comunitaria de los pueblos indígenas-originarios y
comunidades campesinas” was passed by Bolivia’s Plurinational Assembly
provides for a mandatory community justice system that features neither
procedural nor substantive due process.308 These impugned provisions
completely disregard “an individual’s right to be adequately notified of
charges or proceedings [against him or her as well as the right], to be heard
at these proceedings, to be represented by adequate legal counsel, to retain
a transcript of proceedings, and to appeal judgments in ordinary courts”309
– all rights which Bolivia has enshrined in previous criminal and procedural
laws and to which Bolivia has acceded as part of its commitment to
international human rights conventions and customary international law.
Victims can expect immediate punishment subsequent to announced rulings
from communal judges,310 without recourse to appeal, another miscarriage
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
306 See José Marìa Monzòn, The Constitution as a Post-Colonial Discourse: An Insight into the
Constitution of Bolivia, 12 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 839 (2014).
307 HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 11.
308 Ley de Justicia Comunitaria de los pueblos indígenas-originarios y comunidades campesinas,
MPR-DGGP Nº. 393/2006.
309 HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 11.
310 Id.
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of justice. This has led to much pre-procedure public outcry for quick
justice as citizens resort to lynching and other extrajudicial punishments
against those even suspected of a crime.
For the new Bolivian justice system to successfully implement its legal
pluralism agenda, it will be extremely important for the Bolivian authorities
to make a distinction between customary law and vigilantism. Too often
these waters are muddied.311
B. Justicia Comunitaria: Sources and Process
There is a distinct lack of sources or processes that provide for
predictability and fairness as well as notice for the citizens of Bolivia. There
is no formal notification of rules, nor are there consistent institutions to
enforce the rules. There are no established judicial procedures. There are
unwritten norms that exist in each community in which community justice
is practiced. No case law exists to provide sources for the justice system nor
does any codified system for the adjudication of cases exist.312
Because of this paucity of sources, there has been a direct connection
between justicia comunitaria and vigilantism and mob rule. Indeed “for
many Latin American jurists, ‘custom’ remains associated with
barbarism.”313 Community justice or indigenous justice is a common
concept as it pertains to a system of self-government used by many
indigenous peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans in the Americas.314
Bolivia, a country comprised mostly of indigenous Bolivians,315 has
311 Such rights of indigenous justice are also confused when claimed by revolutionary Senderistas,
the Shining Path guerrillas in Peru. “When Shining Path guerrillas occupy peasant villages, they conduct
popular trials and execute people in plazas claiming to carry out ‘popular justice.’” Enrique Mayer, Peru
in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa’s “Inquest in the Andes” Reexamined, in REREADING CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 184-85 (George E. Marcus ed., Duke University Press 1992).
312 But see Alejandro Mansilla Arias, El Derecho Indígena y Las Pautas para la Conformación de
una línea jurisprudencial constitucional en Bolivia, CUADERNOS ELECTRÓNICOS DE FILOSOFÍA DEL
DERECHO, nº 10/2004, https://www.scribd.com/document/157321127/Mansilla.
313 Sieder, supra note 26, at 10.
314 See generally Gonzalo Aguilar, Sandra Lafosse, Hugo Rojas & Rébecca Steward, South/North
Exchange of 2009 - The Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, PACE INT’L
L. REV. Online Companion, Sept. 2010, at 91 (stating that “as behavioral norms have been traditionally
created by indigenous peoples and been applied in a regular manner for a period of time, legal
anthropologists refer to them as customary indigenous law.”) [hereinafter Aguilar]; John A. Mills, Note,
Legal Constructions of Cultural Identity in Latin America: An Argument Against Defining “Indigenous
Peoples,” 8 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 52-62 (2002) (illustrating the oppressive colonizing efforts by
the Europeans toward indigenous peoples of Latin America).
315 According to the ILO, “Bolivia has the highest percentage of indigenous peoples in Latin
America (62% according to UNDP, 2006). Of the indigenous peoples, it is estimated that the majority
are Quechua (50.3%) and Aymara (39.8%). To a lesser degree, although distributed across extensive
territories, are lowland peoples such as the Chiquitano (3.6%) and Guaraní (2.5%). The departments of
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recognized and encouraged the use of indigenous self-governments,
including an indigenous legal system.316 However, the New Constitution of
Bolivia is unclear when indigenous self-government intrudes on human
rights to which the Bolivian State has claimed to adhere to in the last
century.
The media in Bolivia has generally been very critical of community
justice from the very first incidents, which involved lynching.317 Since
2005, there has been a steady increase in lynching and lynch mob attacks
against suspected criminals, accused sexual abusers, and even a corrupt
government official in Bolivia.318 These lynchings are done in areas of the
city where mostly the indigenous and also the poorest, Bolivians live.319
Global media outlets have described this lynching as a form of village
justice or lynch law that is a typical custom of indigenous Bolivians.320
Recognizing this potential problem and spurred by global media, HRF
responded with a scathing country report on Bolivia in January 2008.321 At
the time, the HRF cited Bolivian media outlets as sources of indigenous
brutality. For Professor Daniel M. Goldstein, the HRF report contains a
“basic error that invalidates its conclusions: The HRF report mistakes
lynching and other forms of vigilante violence for community justice.”322
La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, Oruro and Chuquisaca have the highest indigenous concentration.”
ILO,
Bolivia,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/sitestudiocontentelements/
wcms_con_txt_itp_reg_bol_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). Cf. Other statistics vary: According to
the CIA Factbook, “4 4 % of re sp on d e n ts in a 2 0 0 1 n a ti on a l c e n s u s in d ic a te d fe e lin g p a rt
of s o me in d ig e n ou s g r ou p , p re d o m in a n tl y Qu e c h u a o r Ay ma ra ." CIA Factbook, supra
note 17.
316 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 30(14).
317 See generally Helen Popper, Lynchings Raise Specter of Mob Justice in Bolivia, REUTERS (Jun.
29, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN29282058 (stating that there have been
sixty-three lynch mob attacks in both 2006 and 2007); Chris Kraul, Mob Rule Taints Bolivia Indigenous
Law, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 1, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/01/world/fg-bolivia-justice1
(discussing that incidents of mob rule are rising as the Bolivian State continues to recognize indigenous
rights).
318
Brutal
linchamiento,
EL
DEBER.COM,
May
17,
2017,
http://www.eldeber.com.bo/opinion/Brutal-linchamiento-20170516-0096.html [Brutal Linchamiento].
Reed Lindsay, Bolivian peasants turn to lynch law, GUARDIAN, Sept. 18, 2004,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/19/bolivia. Desconocidos linchan al alcalde de una
MUNDO,
June
15,
2004,
aldea
indígena
en
Bolivia,
EL
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/06/15/internacional/1087322198.html. Micaela Villa, En 2014
hubo 35 linchamientos en Bolivia, 10 personas murieron, LA RAZON, Dec. 13, 2014, http://www.larazon.com/ciudades/Saldo-linchamientos-Bolivia-personas-murieron_0_2179582074.html.
319 See Reed Lindsay, Bolivian Peasants Turn to Lynch law, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2004,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/19/bolivia (Aymara peasants and urban slum dwellers
protesting against corrupt government officials have been on the rise).
320 Brutal Linchamiento, supra note 318.
321 HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 11.
322 Daniel M. Goldstein, Response to Human Rights Report on Bolivia, SPERO NEWS (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=14155.
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For Professor Goldstein, community justice is not lynching. Instead,
lynching is a form of vigilante justice adopted by people who were
frustrated by the lack of government action.323 These same people are
mostly poor, indigenous Bolivians who took matter into their own hands.
The terminology used in the media that this vigilante justice is synonymous
with community justice is misleading and inaccurate. Fueling this
inaccuracy is the lack of a codified system for community justice. The
indigenous customs are simply not written and are more of a tradition rather
than a formal legal system.
Further, Goldstein explains that there is no extreme violence or death
penalty in community justice. Instead, the greatest form of punishment is
exile from the community. “Community justice emphasizes reconciliation
and rehabilitation,” explains Goldstein.324 For Goldstein, “community
justice promotes the ‘reeducation’ of community members who violate
collective norms and rules, and the reincorporation of these offenders back
into the community.”325 Thus, although indigenous people may participate
in lynching, it is certainly not an example of what community justice entails.
In an opinion piece a few years later, the Vice-Minister of Indigenous
Justice made clear that lynchings were contrary to the New Constitution of
Bolivia and Law No. 073.326
Indigenous Bolivians are still Bolivians under the New Constitution of
Bolivia. This is corroborated by the insistence under the New Constitution
that none of the legislation listed in the document was meant to take away
any basic fundamental human rights.327 The New Constitution is a
reflection of massive urbanization and migrations from productive fields
and mines. The majority of Bolivians are indigenous and many of them live
in urban cities or their respective outskirts. Even if the State encourages a
form of self-government for indigenous people, its intention was not to
allow indigenous customs and traditions to supersede the laws codified by
the State. Moreover, some of the some of the punishments mirror what the
State would have meted out in the first place.328
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Isabel Ortega Ventura (Viceministra de Justicia Indígena Originario Campesina), La Justicia
Indígena Frente Al Linchamiento, June 20, 2012, http://www.justicia.gob.bo/index.php/noticias/notasde-prensa/780-la-justicia-indigena-frente-al-linchamiento (reprinted from Suplemento Animal Político
del diario La Razón, July 17, 2012).
327 2009 Bolivian Constitution, supra note 12, at art. 3.
328 “Regimes eschewing legal pluralism, then, face the near certainty of violating hallmarks of
indigenous punishment systems by implementing systems largely reliant on prison sentences for serious
crimes.” Lindsay Short, Tradition Versus Power: When Indigenous Customs and State Laws Conflict,
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Instead, the enshrinement of indigenous values is a practical means to
promote compromise and cooperation within the country. The New
Constitution shows indigenous support and conversely, the indigenous are
supportive of the New Constitution of Bolivia because it demonstrates
respect for their customs and shows that the customs are regarded positively.
Community justice is elevated to a recognized and enforced system of law,
running parallel to the more Western-based legal system, as implemented
by the Spanish colonial authorities and fortified during Bolivia’s postIndependence national period.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Legal Pluralism and Legal Monism
A consequence of the Enlightenment Period, legal monism has come to
be understood as “the idea that there must be one and only one centralized
hierarchical legal system in each state” and has long “dominated the
political and legal imagination of the West.”329 Human rights literature has
long documented the forms of pluralism through which alternative forms of
justice can be understood.330
Legal pluralism has been broadly defined as a set of independent and
coexisting institutionalized legal systems that are followed within a single
“social arena.”331 In the context of this Article, legal pluralism signifies the
existence of multiple legal systems; an official legal system largely
influenced by former colonizing powers, running parallel with the more
traditional or customary laws of indigenous peoples.332
15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 376, 391 (2014).
329 Daniel Bonilla Malonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and Pluralism, 40 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 213, 213 (2009).
330 KAMARI MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 232 (2000); see also Nafay
Choudhury, Reconceptualizing Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan, 1 SELECTED PROC. THIRD ANN.
CAN. L. STUDENT CONF. 21 (2010).
331 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30
SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375 (2008).
332 Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Legal Pluralism, Indigenous Law, and the Special Jurisdiction in the
Andean Countries, BEYOND LAW, 2004, at 32, 33, https://www.jfce.jus.br/images/esmafe/materialdidatico/2010/legalPluralism.pdf.
Classical legal pluralism was confined in two ways: geographically, it concerned only the
interplay of Western and non-Western laws in colonial and postcolonial settings; conceptually,
it treated the indigenous nonstate law as subordinate to the official law of the state as introduced
by the colonizing power. The new legal pluralism extends the concept to Western societies and
the interplay between official and unofficial law more generally.
Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245 (2009).
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But legal pluralism is by no means a recent phenomenon. Forms of legal
pluralism have been recorded since the mid-and late medieval periods in
Europe, when different types of legal systems such as local customs and
feudal laws were implemented simultaneously.333 Diverse courts that
adjudicated distinct legal issues such as guild courts, merchant courts, and
church courts that applied laws based on the merits of the case, and also
based on a person’s status, descent, occupation, or citizenship dotted the
continent.334 Centuries went by before government bureaucracies made up
of legal professionals oversaw the implementation of laws as forms of
regulating social life. There was a gradual shift from different legal systems
that ran independently alongside each other to a more commonly accepted
and uniform state law. As such, laws outside of the official state-based
system did not disappear, but lost its equal status and autonomy.335 Instead
of a pluralistic system that enforced community social norms, laws became
about achieving social objectives, mirroring attempts at reformist
movements underway in Europe.336 As more centralized and structured
legal systems developed, certain groups that exercised unofficial legal
systems – like those administered by indigenous peoples and campesinos became underrepresented in the ordinary state law and were thus relegated
to lower standing in the mainstream social sphere.
During this shift, colonizing powers dealt with how to extend the reaches
of their country’s domain by establishing laws and reconciling them with
the local laws and practices of the native populations that they
encountered.337 Local indigenous leaders commonly led “customary
courts” for minor community disputes and these cases were adjudicated
autonomously - unless certain practices were deemed too offensive by the
colonizers’ standards.338 Of course, this clash of sources of laws and
practices was not peaceful, as indigenous systems were uprooted.
Notwithstanding the clashes, indigenous authorities were used as
intermediaries between colonizers and native populations as a means of
obtaining cooperation and control over native communities. The extent of
injustices committed by colonizers to control indigenous communities will
333 See Jean-Louis Halpérin, The Concept of Law: A Western Transplant?, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 333, 335 (2009) (providing a brief overview of the development of legal systems from
medieval times).
334 See generally Tamanaha, supra note 331, at 378-86.
335 See Halpérin, supra note 333, at 345 (providing an anthropological view on the construction of
unofficial law and Westernized common law).
336 Tamanaha, supra note 331, at 381.
337 See generally id. at 409-11.
338 Id. at 407-08.
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not be discussed here, but the forceful attempts at assimilation help explain
the temporary decline of legal pluralism during colonization. The
subjugation and social stigmatization of indigenous groups continued long
after the post-colonial period. Legal pluralism had been absorbed by the
growingly popular Westernized system of a more unified and codified legal
structure.339
During the twentieth century, following growing support for indigenous
rights and the rising desire to make up for past injustices, the idea of
implementing separate governments that followed indigenous customary
laws began to develop in some regions.340 The former attempts at
assimilation had failed; the problem of indigenous groups had not
disappeared, but these policies had bred social and economic deterioration
in many regions, making it necessary to build a new framework that
integrated indigenous rights and laws.
By the mid-twentieth century, some states recognized limited aspects of
indigenous self-regulation, “usos y costumbres” or customary law, but it
was generally not autonomous from state law.341 For instance, before
constitutional reform, some Andean communities allowed customary law as
a secondary source, in effect only if there was an absence of ordinary law
and the two were never to conflict.342 As recently seen in Bolivia, the state
government sanctioned customary law not only as a secondary source, but
as its own legal system in indigenous communities, which may even
contradict with ordinary state law.343 This autonomy makes the case in
Bolivia different from many forms of pluralistic legal systems, because in
other countries, the ordinary government trumps the indigenous
governments through oversight and national legislation.
This shift toward legal pluralism has attempted to reverse the centuries
long history of indigenous subjugation primarily by: (1) Recognizing
indigenous people as independent political actors instead of political
subjects, thus combating the idea of cultural inferiority; and (2) formally
acknowledging cultural diversity and the right of indigenous groups to have
339 “And, as Delmas-Marty argues, this is why harmonization processes are so important for the
development of pluralism: ‘they enable the rapprochement of different systems which, without striving
for uniformity, may be characterized precisely by its less rigid hierarchy due to the recognition of
national margins of appreciation.’” Moritz Hartmann, Review Essay: “Lost in Disordered Clouds:
Transnational Legal Pluralism and the Regulation of Global Asymmetries” – Mireille Delmas-Marty’s
Ordering Pluralism (2009), 11 GERMAN L.J. 1025, 1031 (2010).
340 See generally Debra L. Donahue, Education and Cooperative Management of Tribal Natural
Resources, 42 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2006) (exploring the struggles for self-governance, self-determination
and their ties to resource management).
341 Id.; NICOLE FABRICANT, MOBILIZING BOLIVIA’S DISPLACED: INDIGENOUS POLITICS & THE
STRUGGLE OVER LAND 88 (2012).
342 Fajardo, supra note 332, at 35.
343 Id.
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autonomous authority.344 Thus, these promising changes are attempts to
discard traditional modes of political suppression and open a new path for
indigenous communities to exert control over their legal and social systems,
while balancing the protection of individual rights. However, this new path
of having the ordinary justice system run alongside community justice or
customary legal systems comes with its own set of challenges345 and is still
in its infancy in other countries.
Perhaps we have to rethink the whole administration of justice. An
Africanist wrote about legal pluralism on that continent:
[W]e need to think more precisely about the meaning and enactment
of justice and politics in local contexts – how it should work, whom
it should include, and whom it excludes. We must rethink the
conditions within which we envisage justice in the first place and
expand the basis on which we locate political beings. For it is
limiting to assume that “the law” – rule of law, criminal law, national
law – is the only way that justice can be achieved, especially because
justice itself is not a thing but a set of relations through which people
establish norms of acceptability.346
B. Conflicts in a Legally Pluralistic State
There are many differences in the ways that indigenous legal systems
and ordinary legal systems view crime, punishment, and individual rights.
For instance, merging religious views and rituals with the justice system, as
community justice entails, is a point of divergence with regular national
justice, which aims to remain secularized.347 Also, in the system of
“ordinary justice,” codification is preferred, but in community justice, the
344 Id. at 33.
345 The debate about the effectiveness and understanding of legal pluralism is still ongoing. See
generally Richard Nobles, et al., Using Systems Theory To Study Legal Pluralism: What Could Be
Gained?, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 265 (2012); William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A
Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473 (2010); Tamanaha, Understanding Legal
Pluralism, supra note 331. Franz Von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid Of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37 (2002); Simon Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism: Some
Reflections on the Contemporary Enlargement of the Legal Domain, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 95 (1998); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the “Social Scientific” Concept of Legal
Pluralism 20 J. L. SOC’Y 192 (1993); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal
Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 869 (1988); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L.
1 (1986).
346 Clarke, supra note 330, at 147.
347 Enrique A. Mier Cueto, Las Prácticas Jurídicas Aymaras Desde una Perspectiva Cultural, in
JUSTICIA COMUNITARIA: EN LOS PUEBLOS ORIGINARIOS DE BOLIVIA, 61, 63 (2003).

58

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:1

decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, which means the result cannot
be neatly codified.348
The ordinary justice systems – normally more aligned with Western
systems – strive toward consistent administration of justice by emphasizing
retribution and applying an adversarial process.349 On the other hand,
indigenous systems tend to be more flexible in adjudicating cases in a way
that appropriately resolves a specific case at hand based on what restores
harmony to the community based on the current state of affairs.350
Another conflict arises in regard to social norms. Indigenous and
Western legal systems each have distinct cultural meanings and values, such
as what is considered a minor crime or what constitutes a crime at all.351 For
instance, some public disturbances, religious transgressions, or gossip are
considered criminal according to some indigenous groups, but generally
would not in Westernized legal systems.352 Also, informal justice systems
prioritize restoring social harmony following conflicts over protecting due
process or individual rights.353 The community emphasis presents
differences in goals and affects the acceptable forms of punishment in the
two justice systems. Punishment for a crime under community justice
ordinarily included exiling the perpetrator from his community, shaming,
lashings, or exposure to harsh elements, some actions that might be
construed as torture under Westernized legal systems.354 This contrasts with
ordinary justice, which strives to abide by international standards for
protection of human rights and due process.
This harkens back to the early days of the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia:
In the first days of the revolutionary epoch, a kind of official
normative schizophrenia was introduced into Bolivian public life and
was to tear at the insides of the MNR and weaken its ability to
reorganize the country. There was a serious contradiction between
the MNR’s tying of itself to old norms and institutions and the oftenviolent process by which the social and economic foundations of
348 But see “Oral cultures are being defended by the mechanisms of bureaucracy and law – formal,
written rules and procedures.” NIEZEN, supra note 278, at 27.
349 Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition
Typology, 38 CONN. L. REV. 239, 242 (2005).
350 See generally Aguilar, supra note 314, at 85 (claiming that “any attempt to standardize or fix
customary laws as a written norm seriously damages their adaptive quality”).
351 Tracy Ulltveit-Moe, Amnesty International and Indigenous Rights: Congruous or Conflict?, 31
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 717, 728 (2007).
352 Id.
353 Connolly, supra note 349, at 241.
354 Ulltveit-Moe, supra note 351, at 726.
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those norms and institutions were dismantled.355
The actions at the time were ex post facto justified as “revolutionary
justice.”356 This is not unlike how “justicia comunitaria” is being used to
justify the political intimidation of opposition figures like former VicePresident Victor Hugo Cárdenas or the public lynching of suspected
criminals in the Morales era.
Whereas the search for greater sensitivity of the judicial system to
cultural differences involves improved, that is ‘equal,’ access to the existing
legal system, the claim for recognition of jurisdiction according to
indigenous peoples’ own laws and procedures challenges the modern state
in its claim to exclusive jurisdiction sustained in the ideology of
universalism and equality before the law. In terms of human rights, debate
revolves around the relation between individual and collective rights.357
There is a danger of competing jurisdictions in situations of legal
pluralism. At what time does the indigenous system of justice reign and
over what matters and at what time does the “ordinary” system of justice
prevail? How do the governing authorities ensure equality before the law?
In the end, this may create a parallel reality of sorts – one legal system stuck
in a modern age, based on fundamental human rights as prescribed by the
myriad international treaties signed, ratified, and deposited by Bolivia, and
the other based on an ephemeral, yet traditionally and wholly subscribed to,
set of principles.358 Moreover, when it comes to Aymara, Quechua, or
355 Malloy, supra note 70, at 170.
356
Instead of claiming the advent of a totally new era which, through revolutionary action, would
define and legitimate its own normative world, the MNR harked to a past understanding of
right, while presiding over a process that aimed direct attacks at the heart of the past. Thus,
official justice and revolutionary justice collided, resulting in a situation in which there was
neither justice nor any understanding of what would constitute justice. Justice became a thing
to be defined locally through power, more often than not by force; as effective power came to
vary widely throughout the country, so too did notions of the justice or the right. Such a
situation is, almost by definition, intrinsic to those processes we call revolution; in Bolivia, this
was exacerbated by an official clinging to a set of abstraction in the fact of a reality that was
violently sweeping away the solidity which underpinned them.
Malloy, supra note 70, at 170-71.
357 Assies, supra note 10, at 17-8.
358
There is also opposition to legal pluralism as a facilitator of specific disfavored elements of
indigenous law that are seen to violate human rights standards. The argument goes that legal
pluralism could be used as a sort of catchall provision, allowing any sort of punishment or
practice in the name of maintaining cultural plurality.
Short, supra note 328, at 392 (2014). Professor Frederic Megret has also written that “condemnations
of legal pluralism based merely on disapproval of particular features of minority law are conceptually
quite weak.” Frederic Megret, Is There Ever a “Right to One’s Own Law”? An Exploration of Possible
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Guaraní justicia comunitaria, these are peoples whose communities exist in
more than one nation-state.359
The challenges that changing times and competing influences present are
not new: “[L]aw in Bolivia has both embodied and constituted a whole
range of other social categories; for example, gender relations, relations of
production, religious practice, and even social identity itself.”360 This
results in an obvious tension, explaining why there are protests seemingly
daily as the center of La Paz gets shut down by one group or another.
For centuries, Bolivian law has contended with contrasting and
competing influences. Some of these tendencies push Bolivia towards
modernity, such as the laws needed to ensure compliance with the World
Trade Organization or other international conventions that facilitate mostly
extractive, industry-related business. Other influences have pushed the
country in the opposite direction - to Bolivians’ past by fusing older, more
traditional indigenous techniques.
The elasticity of law in Bolivia has been its most defining
characteristic, which becomes all the more important in light of the
fact that law is officially prefigured and thus formally closed to all
nonlegal cultural, political, and economic imperatives.361
It is no surprise then that the Bolivian Government has been accused of
unfair treatment of the indigenous populations,362 even from Evo Morales,
an indigenous leader. Although he is indigenous by background and carried
the banner of indigenous rights in his lead up to the presidency and while in
the Office of the President, human rights violations against indigenous
Rights Foundations for Legal Pluralism, 45 ISR. L. REV. 3, 5-6 (2012).
359 “[T]here are norms and practices that apply or have force in more than one jurisdiction, but
without any transcendent authority. We might call parallel norms. They apply to more than one country
or jurisdiction, but on a voluntary basis, so to speak.” Friedman, supra note 42, at 69.
360 Goodale, supra note 25, at 24.
361 Id. at 25.
362 Identity In An Era Of Self-Determination, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 38, 51 (2006)
(“International human rights law, however, is increasingly perceived as a vehicle to achieve justice for
indigenous groups, including redress for past wrongs committed in the process of colonialism, and
efforts to correct present unfair treatment”); Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
Introduction,
OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ipeoples/srindigenouspeoples/pages/sripeoplesindex.aspx (last visited
Feb. 10, 2018) (stating that “Indigenous peoples across the world experience the consequences of
historical colonization and invasion of their territories, and face discrimination because of their distinct
cultures, identities and ways of life”).
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people363 have taken place during his three administrations.364
Critics of traditional indigenous justice in Bolivia have expressed
some great concern with the new laws being recognized and enforced
around communities throughout the country. For these critics, the mob
violence has become associated with justicia comunitaria after capturing
international attention in 2005, when a mayor was lynched and no culprit
was criminally prosecuted. The international media was quick to name the
lynching as a product of community or indigenous justice that is typified by
its brutality and savagery.365 Instead, community justice is rehabilitative,
and lynching is an inaccurate example of community justice.366
363
See
Annual
Report
2012,
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
81,
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/air12-report-english.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (conveying the
tensions between the indigenous population and the Morales government in 2012, due to the
government’s effort to construct a road through indigenous territory. When confronted by indigenous
protestors claiming that the Morales government was violating their constitutional rights by constructing
this road, many were injured by “tear gas and truncheons” by the Bolivian police. The Morales
government eventually cancelled the project and the deputy police who ordered the police operation that
caused the injuries was put under house arrest); Bolivian President Evo Morales Expels USAID, BBC
NEWS (May 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22371275 (stating that “[h]e
[Evo Morales] was re-elected by a landslide in 2009, but has since faced protests from indigenous
communities angered by the construction of a major road through their territory, and by police and army
officers demanding better pay”); Bolivia’s Indigenous People Join Fight to Save Gran Chaco
Wilderness, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/08/boliviaindigenous-people-gran-chaco-wilderness (stating that the Morales government “had shown no interest”
in supporting conservation efforts to preserve the threatened Gran Chaco region, Bolivia’s largest
national park which houses several indigenous populations); Protests Challenge Ecuador Indigenous
Summit, BBC NEWS (June 26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10419958 (explaining that the summit
“promises to build societies that respect the rights of Latin America’s indigenous people, as well as those
of African descent.” The Bolivian indigenous effort to give a written statement to President Morales
during the summit, however, was silenced, as they were “held back by police.”).
364 There may very well be a fourth administration for President Morales, as he considers making
an illegal bid for re-election. Andrés Oppenheimer, This is no joke: Bolivian ruler invokes his “human
right” to stay in power, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 5, 2017, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/newscolumns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article176991121.html.
365
The Spanish-speaking urban culture of Bolivia, if not based completely on the exploitation of
the Indian, did, at the least, demand his relinquishment of the ability to posit a different culture
in the geographic reality of Bolivia. The Spanish-speaking (“civilized”) culture was born
through conquest and continued by means of subjugation. The relationship of the national
Spanish culture to the local Indian cultures continued to be one of colonialism. As in all such
cases, this relationship was pervaded with mutual hate, distrust, and fear projected in racial
terms. Indio (“Indian’”) was a word which conjured the image of a subhuman (uncivilized)
being, locked in ignorance and bent on violent revenge.
Malloy, supra note 70, at 190.
366 See DANIEL M. GOLDSTEIN, OUTLAWED: BETWEEN SECURITY AND RIGHTS IN A BOLIVIAN
CITY 186 (2012), supporting the notion that “lynching is not community justice in the classic sense”
stating that, “After every lynching event, politicians and left-leaning intellectuals are quoted in
newspapers drawing the distinction); Franz Chávez, Lynch Mobs Hide Behind ‘Community Justice’ in
Bolivia, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/12/lynch-
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Remaining questions that are worth exploring include: whether the
treatment of women within the indigenous population violates the
international treaty against discrimination of women, or whether whipping
constitutes a form of torture that violates human rights? Moreover, should
an outsider look at the indigenous community as a fully functional entity or
a community of kin? In the latter situation, would it also make sense, then,
to regard whipping as similar to parents when they discipline their children?
Questions like these remain unanswered by the Bolivian State and will
continue to do so until the legislature actually enacts laws that will clarify
the ambiguity reflected in the New Constitution. For now, the New
Constitution of Bolivia serves as a reflection of the State’s recognition of
the indigenous population as Bolivians.
Not only is there a need for a broader understanding of what constitutes
“indigenousness,” there are criticisms of the implementation of indigenous
law in Bolivian legislation. The legislative package was opposed by Human
Rights Watch and with former Bolivian Presidents.367 Since the
implementation of indigenous law in the New Constitution of Bolivia, with
the self-determination movements coming out of Santa Cruz and other
departments around Bolivia, the issues will only get more complicated.368
mobs-invoke-community-justice-bolivia/ (referring to lynching as “vigilante justice in impoverished
rural and urban areas that has nothing to do with indigenous community justice, which the perpetrators
invoke to justify their actions.” According to the Departmental prosecutor, Freddy Rorrico, “Lynching
is murder, and it cannot be permitted under the concept of community justice, because it has nothing to
do with it; it is a summary execution that violates constitutional principles and due process.”).
367 Mabel Azcui, La Polémica 'Refundación' del Sistema Judicial Boliviano, EL PAIS (May 6,
2010), http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/polemica/refundacion/sistema/judicial/boliviano/
elpepuint/20100507elpepuint_4/Tes.
368 See Helena DeMoura, Four Bolivian Regions Declare Autonomy From Government, CNN
News
(Dec.
15,
2007,
10:54
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/12/15/bolivia.unrest/index.html. The article illustrates
that
[C]ouncil representatives vowed to legitimize the so-called autonomy statutes through a
referendum that would legally separate the natural-gas rich districts from President Evo
Morales’ government. The move also aims to separate the states from Bolivia’s new
constitution which calls for, among other things, a heavier taxation on the four regions to help
finance more social programs.
Id.; Bolivia’s Lower House Approves Indigenous Justice Law, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10270787. Opposition parties claim that such recognition of indigenous
justice law when it comes to settling “disputes according to their own cultural values” can lead to mob
rule. Id. A month prior to the vote, “four policemen were lynched by an Andean clan in the name of
indigenous justice.” Id.; see also Abigail Griffith, Struggles in Latin America Over Rights of
Indigenous and National Priorities, SPERO NEWS (June 21, 2010),
http://www.speroforum.com/a/35271/Struggles-in-Latin-America-over-rights-of-Indigenous-andnational-priorities. Four police officers were lynched in the Amazonian region of Bolivia in May 2010.
Id. This article claims that the “lack of a clearly defined process to mediate often hostile interactions
between indigenous custom and Western law has left room for tension, conflict, and violence to brew
between indigenous people and the state.” Id.; see also Two Bolivian Broadcast Journalists Killed,
FREEDOM HOUSE (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/two-bolivian-broadcast-
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C. Legal Pluralism in Other Countries
Bolivia is not the only country to attempt folding indigenous norms and
mechanisms into the state-based legal system.369 Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Peru, have similarly also
traveled down this path.370 Guatemala, too, has had its experiences with
integrating indigenous justice,371 but it is more difficult given that
indigenous rights were part of the thirty-five year civil war that ravaged the
country.372 Activists for indigenous rights have called for traditional
practices to be integrated into a newly reformed judicial system in
journalists-killed (detailing how siblings from the Aymara ethnic group, both broadcast journalists,
were killed unexpectedly). According to Freedom House, “[t]hreats and attacks against the news media
occurred with increasing regularity in the last two years.” Id.; see, e.g., Rick Kearns, New Indigenous
Community Justice Sanctions Criticized in Bolivia, INDIAN COUNTRY (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/new-indigenous-community-justice-sanctionscriticized-bolivia-146222 (describing the struggle between community justice as seen in a particular
indigenous Bolivian tribe, the Qhapaq Uma Suya of La Paz, who announced that in their district they
will use chemical castration on rapists and amputate the hands of thieves who have stolen three or four
times, versus a contrary perception from other national indigenous leaders who oppose these particular
acts).
369 Aguilar, supra note 314, at 61-2.
370 Id. at 61. “Five Latin American constitutions spell out in general terms peoples’ right to selfdetermination: Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. However, except in the case of
Mexico, none of the constitutions explicitly recognizes the right to self-determination for indigenous
peoples.” Id. Moreover, it is also “possible to find constitutional norms that also recognize the living
norms and organizations that are fixed by indigenous peoples through their customs, including internal
forms of governance and/or mechanisms to resolve their controversies through institutions and
procedures that they define. This situation exists within the Constitutions of Bolivia, Colombia, and to
some extent in Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Id.at 87; Van Cott, Legal
Pluralism, supra note 15, at 207 (stating that “Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay and Peru – adopted or modified constitutions to recognize the multiethnic, multicultural nature
of their societies”); Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin
America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587 n.21 (2011) (stating that the “application of
justice by indigenous communities according to their customary law, but within limits that harmonize
the state jurisdiction with the indigenous jurisdiction.” Such constitutions include Bolivia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela).
371 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1985 CON LAS REFORMAS DE 1993 [CONSTITUTION] Nov.
17, 1993, arts. 58, 66 (Guat.), http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/laws1/guatemala_constitution_eng; Aguilar, supra note 314, at 87 (explaining that the Constitution of the
Republic of Guatemala “simply recognize[s] the existence of indigenous customs, including in some
occasions that the customs will be respected, protected and/or promoted”).
372 Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 86 (1999).
In Guatemala, on December 29, 1996, ‘the guns may have finally fallen silent.’ The peace
accord signed that day between the government and the guerrilleros, many of them Maya
Indians, proclaimed to put an end to this country's long, bloody, and ‘forgotten’ civil war which
left at least 100,000 persons killed, 40,000 disappeared, about 250,000 children orphaned, and
more than one million people driven from their homes. The final accords signed guarantee,
inter alia, Indian rights and land reform.
Id. at 86.
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Guatemala, a Central American country whose citizens are overwhelming
are indigenous.373 These calls have had limited success.374 “[D]espite some
notable advances, the quality of ordinary justice remained extremely poor
and highly likely to exclude indigenous people.”375
Outside of Latin America, there has been much movement as well. In
spite of the inherent conflicts of a legally pluralistic state, countries such as
Canada376 and New Zealand,377 among others, have officially recognized
indigenous governments and are still trying to define what rights fall under
these jurisdictions. As seen in some legally pluralistic states, there are many
positive results to implementing unofficial state systems, particularly in
many rural places and developing countries where the official system is
largely incapacitated due to infrastructure and problems with
legitimization.378 Community justice or the implementation of indigenous
self-governance, however, are still contentious and experimental in places
373 See MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, THE ROOTS OF ROUGH JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LYNCHING
90 (2011), (illustrating a scholar’s perspective arguing “that the actions of Guatemalan lynchers take
meaning as grassroots justice by disenfranchised indigenous populations […] [who are] angered by slow,
unrepresentative, and ineffectual state courts, [and are] deprived by the erosion of traditional nonviolent
indigenous forms of dispute mediation”);
Id. See generally ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 278, at 84 (stating that “Indigenous peoples’
marginalized position is often reflected in their limited access to justice. Not only do they have a special
risk of becoming victims of corruption, sexual and economic exploitation, violations of fundamental
labour rights, violence, etc., but they also have limited possibilities for seeking redress.”).
374 Guatemala's Indigenous Seek Recognition for Justice System, VOA (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.voanews.com/a/guatemala-indigenous-seek-recognition-of-justice-system/3726790.html.
Recognition of Indigenous Justice System Stalls in Guatemala, TELESUR.COM (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Recognition-of-Indigenous-Justice-System-Stalls-inGuatemala-20170216-0023.html.
375 Sieder, Judiciary, supra note 43, at 227.
376 See John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions In Canada, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 167,
173-74 (2005) (stating that “Canada itself [] includes common law, civil law and indigenous legal
traditions. These legal customs are constitutionally recognized. Canada is a juridically pluralistic state,
and draws on many sources of law to sustain order throughout the land”) [hereinafter Borrows]; Claire
Charters, Do Maori Rights Racially Discriminate Against Non Maori?, 40 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 649, 660 (2009) (stating that “[t]he Canadian Constitution protects aboriginal and treaty rights,”
citing to section 35 of the Canadian Constitution).
377 See Charters, supra note 376, at 659 (detailing that New Zealand recognizes Maori political
rights; though, it does so in a very “soft way, far from models that recognize degrees of Indigenous
peoples’ autonomy or self-government”).
378 Connolly, supra note 349, at 240.
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like Canada,379 Australia,380 and New Zealand,381 requiring more studies to
determine successful strategies.
These “informal” justice systems share some characteristics, including:
generally being less expensive and more efficient to operate than Western
legal systems, dependence on voluntary participation by community
members, a focus on restorative justice, and the ability to engender more
trust than official systems that communities perceive as corrupt.382
Moreover, basic legal issues facing pluralistic systems include: (1) whether
379 See Paul Joffe, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Canadian Government
Positions Incompatible with Genuine Reconciliation, 26 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 121, 157 (2010) (arguing
that the Canadian government’s conduct toward its indigenous population is “untenable and
incompatible with constitutional and international obligations,” and that the process of reconciliation
with its indigenous population is “likely to be a long one”); Brandi Morin, Where Does Canada Sit 10
Years After the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?, CBCNEWS (Sept. 13, 2017),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/where-does-canada-sit-10-years-after-undrip-1.4288480; Borrows,
supra note 376, at 174:
[W]hile civil and common law traditions are generally recognized nationwide [in Canada], this
is not always the case with indigenous legal traditions. Yet, indigenous legal traditions can have
great force and impact in peoples’ lives despite their lack of prominence in broader circles.
Indigenous legal traditions are a reality within Canada and should be more effectively
recognized as such.
380 See Emma Rogers, Aust Adopts UN Indigenous Declaration, ABCNET (Apr. 2, 2009, 12: 33
AM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-03/aust-adopts-un-indigenous-declaration/1640444. See
also SUMMARY NO. 8, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/declaration-rights-indigenous-peoples:
“Australia voted against the Declaration when it was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. In 2009,
the Australian Government formally endorsed the Declaration and have made other steps to advance the
rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. However, there is a need for a holistic and
coordinated approach to giving full effect to the Declaration.” (emphasis added); Rebecca Tsosie,
Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics, and Human Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV.
1133 n.67 (2012) (stating that the Australian Aboriginal people could not legally occupy their lands until
Mabo v. Queensland was decided in 1992); Dylan Lino, The Politics of Inclusion: The Right of SelfDetermination, Statutory Bills of Rights and Indigenous Peoples, 34 MELB. U. L. REV. 839, 840-57
(2010) (providing a perspective that discourages the Australian government from recognizing the
indigenous right of self-determination in its statutory bill of rights, first, because there are material
inadequacies with how the Australian human rights consultation committees consult with indigenous
populations when considering to implement the indigenous right to self-determination and, second,
because this manner of recognition will allow for unilateral state control over this right); Blakeney, supra
note 278, at 426-27 (according to an expert panel, “Aboriginal cultures need to receive greater
constitutional protection’” when it relates to protecting their spiritual beliefs).
381 Blakeney, supra note 278, at 412. The indigenous people of New Zealand have taken part in
declaratory activism asserting their rights, one of which is urging existing governments and international
agencies to recognize that the indigenous population should be able to control and protect the
dissemination of their customary knowledge. Id. Some argue that, “the culmination of this declaratory
activism was the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Id. at 413. See also
Danielle M. Conway, Indigenizing Intellectual Property Law: Customary Law, Legal Pluralism, And
The Protection Of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Identity, And Resources, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
207, 214-15 (2009) (illustrating the struggles that the Maori indigenous groups have endured to assert
their sovereignty, self-determination, and autonomy); Charters, supra note 376, at 659.
382 Connolly, supra note 349, at 241.
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indigenous jurisdiction should be mandatory or optional, letting parties
choose between indigenous and state courts; and (2) what happens when
crimes or disputes involve both indigenous and non-indigenous parties? To
reconcile these problems, one can analyze how legal pluralism has been
implemented in other countries and borrow strategies.383
Regardless, this is something the Americas, like much of the world, will
have to address in the coming years as indigenous groups continue to claim
their internationally promulgated and nationally adopted rights. Bolivia is
at ground zero of the battle to embrace indigenous practices in a pluralistic,
modern sovereign state. But the integration of such traditional mechanisms
into a Western-based justice system challenges modern human rights
protections in the name of promoting self-determination.384

383
[W]hatever the broader political motivations for the wave of multicultural reforms advanced
during the 1990s, the fact that indigenous peoples’ collective rights are now recognized as part
of the block of constitutional norms in many countries has potentially opened up a new role for
the judiciary in the defense of those rights.
Sieder, Judiciary, supra note 43, at 215.
384
Human rights advocates face the challenges of how to understand power dynamics within
legally plural constellations of governance, and how best to support women—and men—in
their struggles for more equitable and less violent relations and for human dignity.
Rachel Sieder, Legal Pluralism and Indigenous Women’s Rights in Mexico: The Ambiguities of
Recognition, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1125, 1126 (2016).
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ANNEX: POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PLURINATIONAL STATE
385
OF BOLIVIA (2009) (Select Provisions)
PREAMBLE
In ancient times mountains arose, rivers moved, and lakes were formed.
Our Amazonia, our swamps, our highlands, and our plains and valleys were
covered with greenery and flowers. We populated this sacred Mother Earth
with different faces, and since that time we have understood the plurality
that exists in all things and in our diversity as human beings and cultures.
Thus, our peoples were formed, and we never knew racism until we were
subjected to it during the terrible times of colonialism.
We, the Bolivian people, of plural composition, from the depths of
history, inspired by the struggles of the past, by the anti-colonial indigenous
uprising, and in independence, by the popular struggles of liberation, by the
indigenous, social and labor marches, by the water and October wars, by the
struggles for land and territory, construct a new State in memory of our
martyrs.
A State based on respect and equality for all, on principles of
sovereignty, dignity, interdependence, solidarity, harmony, and equity in
the distribution and redistribution of the social wealth, where the search for
a good life predominates; based on respect for the economic, social,
juridical, political and cultural pluralism of the inhabitants of this land; and
on collective coexistence with access to water, work, education, health and
housing for all.
We have left the colonial, republican and neo-liberal State in the past.
We take on the historic challenge of collectively constructing a Unified
Social State of Pluri-National Communitarian law, which includes and
articulates the goal of advancing toward a democratic, productive, peaceloving and peaceful Bolivia, committed to the full development and free
determination of the peoples.

385 POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA (2009),
CONSTITUTEPROJECT.ORG, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf (translated
by Max Planck Institute).
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We women and men, through the Constituent Assembly (Asamblea
Constituyente) and with power originating from the people, demonstrate our
commitment to the unity and integrity of the country.
We found Bolivia anew, fulfilling the mandate of our people, with the
strength of our Pachamama and with gratefulness to God.
Honor and glory to the martyrs of the heroic constituent and liberating
effort, who have made this new history possible.
ARTICLE 1
Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National
Communitarian Law (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional
Comunitario) that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality
and on political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the
integration process of the country.
ARTICLE 3
The Bolivian nation is formed by all Bolivians, the native indigenous
nations and peoples, and the inter-cultural and Afro-Bolivian communities
that, together, constitute the Bolivian people.
ARTICLE 30
I. A nation and rural native indigenous people consists of every human
collective that shares a cultural identity, language, historic tradition,
institutions, territory and world view, whose existence predates the Spanish
colonial invasion.
II. In the framework of the unity of the State, and in accordance with this
Constitution, the nations and rural native indigenous peoples enjoy the
following rights:
1. To be free.
2. To their cultural identity, religious belief, spiritualities, practices and
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customs, and their own world view.
3. That the cultural identity of each member, if he or she so desires, be
inscribed together with Bolivian citizenship in his identity card, passport
and other identification documents that have legal validity.
4. To self-determination and territoriality.
5. That its institutions be part of the general structure of the State.
6. To the collective ownership of land and territories.
7. To the protection of their sacred places.
8. To create and administer their own systems, means and networks of
communication.
9. That their traditional teachings and knowledge, their traditional
medicine, languages, rituals, symbols and dress be valued, respected and
promoted.
10. To live in a healthy environment, with appropriate management and
exploitation of the ecosystems.
11. To collective ownership of the intellectual property in their
knowledge, sciences and learning, as well as to its evaluation, use,
promotion and development.
12. To an inter-cultural, intra-cultural and multi-language education in
all educational systems.
13. To universal and free health care that respects their world view and
traditional practices.
14. To the practice of their political, juridical and economic systems in
accord with their world view.
15. To be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through
their institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be
foreseen to affect them. In this framework, the right to prior obligatory
consultation by the State with respect to the exploitation of nonrenewable
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natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected and
guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement.
16. To participate in the benefits of the exploitation of natural resources
in their territory.
17. To autonomous indigenous territorial management, and to the
exclusive use and exploitation of renewable natural resources existing in
their territory without prejudice to the legitimate rights acquired by third
parties.
18. To participate in the organs and institutions of the State.
III. The State guarantees, respects and protects the rights of the nations
and the rural native indigenous peoples consecrated in this Constitution and
the law.
ARTICLE 31
I. The nations and the rural native indigenous peoples that are in danger
of extinction, in voluntary isolation and not in contact, shall be protected
and respected with respect to their forms of individual and collective life.
II. The nations and the rural native indigenous peoples that live in
isolation and out of contact enjoy the right to maintain themselves in that
condition, and to the legal definition and consolidation of the territory which
they occupy and inhabit.
ARTICLE 42
I. It is the responsibility of the State to promote and guarantee the respect
for, and the use, research and practice of traditional medicine, rescuing
ancestral knowledge and practices created from the thinking and values of
all the nations and the rural native indigenous peoples.
II. The promotion of traditional medicine shall include the registry of
natural medicines and of their curative properties, as well as the protection
of their knowledge as intellectual, historic, cultural property and as
patrimony of the nations and the rural native indigenous peoples.
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III. The law shall regulate the practice of traditional medicine and shall
guarantee the quality of service.
ARTICLE 98
I. Cultural diversity constitutes the essential basis of the Pluri-National
Communitarian State (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional
Comunitario). The inter-cultural character is the means for cohesion and for
harmonic and balanced existence among all the peoples and nations. The
intercultural character shall exist with respect for differences and in
conditions of equality.
II. The State takes strength from the existence of rural native indigenous
cultures, which are custodians of knowledge, wisdom, values, spiritualities
and world views.
III. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to preserve,
develop, protect and disseminate the existing cultures of the country.
ARTICLE 100
I. The world views, myths, oral history, dances, cultural practices,
knowledge and traditional technologies are patrimony of the nations and
rural native indigenous peoples. This patrimony forms part of the expression
and identity of the State.
ARTICLE 119
I. During the legal process, the parties in conflict enjoy equal
opportunities to exercise the faculties and rights that may help them,
whether in an ordinary process or by rural native indigenous process.
ARTICLE 178
I. The power to impart justice emanates from the Bolivian people and is
based on the principles of independence, impartiality, juridical security,
publicity, probity, promptness, being free of charge, legal pluralism, being
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inter-cultural, equity, service to society, citizen participation, social
harmony and respect for rights.
ARTICLE 179
I. The judicial function is singular. Ordinary jurisdiction is exercised by
the Supreme Court of Justice, the departmental courts of justice, the
sentencing courts and the judges; the agro-environmental jurisdiction is
exercised by the Agro-Environmental Court and judges; and the rural native
indigenous jurisdiction is exercised by their own authorities. There shall be
specialized jurisdictions regulated by the law.
II. Ordinary jurisdiction and rural native indigenous jurisdiction enjoy
equal status.
III. Constitutional justice is imparted by the Pluri-National
Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional).
IV. The Council of Judges is part of the Judicial Organ (Organo
Judicial).
ARTICLE 190
I. The nations and native indigenous rural peoples shall exercise their
jurisdictional functions and competency through their authorities, and shall
apply their own principles, cultural values, norms and procedures.
II. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction respects the right to life, the
right to defense and other rights and guarantees established in this
Constitution.
ARTICLE 191
I. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction is based on the specific
connection between the persons who are members of the respective nation
or rural native indigenous people.
II. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction is exercised in the following
areas ofpersonal, material and territorial legal effect:

2018]

LEGAL PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA

73

1. Members of the nation or rural native indigenous people are subject
to this jurisdiction whether they act as plaintiffs or defendants, claimants or
accusers, whether they are persons who are denounced or accused, or are
appellants or respondents.
2. This jurisdiction hears rural native indigenous matters pursuant to that
established in a law of Jurisdictional Demarcation.
3. This jurisdiction applies to the relations and juridical acts that are
carried out, or the effects of which are produced, within the jurisdiction of
a rural native indigenous people.
ARTICLE 192
I. Each public authority or person shall obey the decisions of the rural
native indigenous jurisdiction.
II. To secure compliance with the decisions of the rural native
indigenous jurisdiction, its authorities may request the support of the
competent bodies of the State.
III. The State shall promote and strengthen rural native indigenous
justice. The law of Jurisdictional Demarcation shall determine the
mechanisms of coordination and cooperation between rural native
indigenous jurisdiction and ordinary jurisdiction and agro-environmental
jurisdiction and all the recognized constitutional jurisdictions.
ARTICLE 196
I. The Pluri-National Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional
Plurinacional) assures the supremacy of the Constitution, exercises
constitutional control, and safeguards respect for and enforcement of
constitutional rights and guarantees.
II. As criteria to be applied in its interpretive role, the Pluri-National
Constitutional Court shall give preference to the intent of the constituent
assembly as demonstrated in its documents, acts and resolutions, as well as
the literal tenor of the text.
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ARTICLE 197
I. The Pluri-National Constitutional Court shall consist of Judges elected
on the basis of pluri-nationality, with representation from the ordinary
system and the rural native indigenous system.
II. The substitute Judges of the Pluri-National Constitutional Court shall
not receive remuneration, and shall assume functions only in the case of the
absence of the titled Judge or for other reasons established by law.
III. The composition, organization and functions of the Pluri-National
Constitutional Court shall be regulated by law.
ARTICLE 199
I. To become a Judge of the Pluri-National Constitutional Court, in
addition to the general requisites to become a public servant, one must be
thirty five years of age and have specialized or credited experience of at
least eight years in the disciplines of Constitutional law, Administrative law
or Human Rights law. For purposes of determining merit, experience as a
native authority under its system of justice shall be taken into account.
II. The candidates for the Pluri-National Constitutional Court shall be
proposed by organizations of civil society and the nations and rural native
indigenous peoples.
ARTICLE 202
In addition to those established by law, the powers of the Pluri-National
Constitutional Court, are to hear and resolve the following:
1. As the court of jurisdiction in the matters of pure law concerning the
unconstitutionality of laws, Autonomous Statutes, Constitutional Charters,
decrees and every type of ordinance and non-judicial resolution. If the case
is of abstract character, only the President of the Republic, Senators,
Deputies, Legislators and the maximum authorities of the autonomous
territorial entities may present it to the court.
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2. The conflicts of jurisdiction and powers among the organs of popular
power.
3. The conflicts of jurisdiction between the Pluri-National government
and the autonomous and decentralized territorial entities, and between the
latter.
4. The appeals of fees, taxes, rates, licenses, rights or contributions that
are created, modified or suppressed in violation of that set forth in the
Constitution.
5. The appeals of resolutions of the Legislative Organ, when its
resolutions affect one or more rights, regardless of who might be affected.
6. The review of the actions of Liberty, Constitutional Protection,
Protection of Privacy, Popular actions and those for Compliance. This
review shall not impede the immediate and obligatory application of the
resolution that decided the action.
7. The legal consultations of the President of the Republic, of the PluriNational Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court of Justice or the AgroEnvironmental Court on the constitutionality of proposed bills. It is
obligatory to comply with the decision of the Constitutional Court.
8. The legal consultations of the rural native indigenous authorities on
the application of their juridical norms as applied in a concrete case.
Compliance with the decision of the Constitutional Court is obligatory.
9. The review of the constitutionality of international treaties prior to
their ratification.
10. The constitutionality of the procedure of partial reform of the
Constitution.
11. The conflicts of authority between the rural native indigenous
jurisdiction and ordinary and agro-environmental jurisdiction.
12. The direct appeals of nullity.
ARTICLE 210
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I. The organization and functioning of the organizations of the nations,
rural native indigenous peoples, and citizen associations and political parties
must be democratic.
II. The internal election of the leaders and the candidates of the citizen
associations, and of the political parties, shall be regulated and supervised
by the Pluri-National Electoral Organ, which shall guarantee the equal
participation of men and women.
III. The nations and rural native indigenous peoples may elect their
candidates according to their own democratic communitarian norms.
ARTICLE 289
Rural native indigenous autonomy consists in self-government as an
exercise of free determination of the nations and rural native indigenous
peoples, the population of which shares territory, culture, history,
languages, and their own juridical, political, social and economic
organization or institutions.
ARTICLE 290
I. The formation of rural native indigenous autonomy is based on
ancestral territories, currently inhabited by those peoples and nations, and
pursuant to the will of their population as expressed through consultation,
in accordance with the Constitution and the law.
II. The self-governance of the rural native indigenous autonomies is
exercised according to their norms, institutions, authorities and procedures,
in accordance with their authority and competences, and in harmony with
the Constitution and the law.
ARTICLE 291
I. The rural native indigenous autonomies are rural native indigenous
territories and the municipalities and regions that adopt that character,
pursuant to that established in the Constitution and the law.
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II. Two or more rural native indigenous peoples can form a single rural
native indigenous autonomy.
ARTICLE 292
Each rural, native, or indigenous autonomy shall draft its Statute
according to its own norms and procedures, in conformity with the
Constitution and the law.
ARTICLE 293
I. The indigenous autonomy, based on consolidated indigenous
territories and those undergoing that process and once consolidated, shall be
formed by the express will of the population through consultation, as the
only necessary requisite, pursuant to their own norms and procedures.
II. If the establishment of an indigenous originary peasant autonomy
affects the boundaries of municipal districts, the indigenous originary
peasant nation or people and the municipal government must agree on a new
district demarcation. If it affects municipal boundaries, a procedure for its
approval shall be conducted by the Pluri-National Legislative Assembly,
following the fulfillment of the special requirements and conditions
provided for by statute.
III. Statute shall establish the minimum population requirements and
other modalities for the constitution of an indigenous peasant farmer
autonomy.
IV. To constitute an indigenous originary peasant autonomy extending
to territories in one or more municipalities, statute shall determine the
articulation, coordination and cooperation mechanisms for the exercise of
its government.
ARTICLE 296
The government of the rural native indigenous autonomies is exercised
through their own norms and forms of organization, with the name that
corresponds to each town, nation or community, as established in their
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statutes and subject to the Constitution and the law.
ARTICLE 304
I. The rural native indigenous autonomies shall exercise the following
exclusive authorities:
1. To elaborate their Statute for the exercise of their autonomy pursuant
to the Constitution and the law.
8. Exercise of rural native indigenous jurisdiction for the application of
justice and the resolution of conflict through their own norms and
procedures in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

